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ABSTRACT 
South Africa introduced inflation targeting as a monetary policy framework in 2000. 
This marked a sizable shift in monetary policy management from the prevlOUS 
"eclectic" approach and the explicit focus on M3 money supply before that. 
The study appraises the effectiveness of monetary policy under this new dispensation. 
However, the analysis does not centre on inflation outcomes, which can be a measure 
of effectiveness because they are the overriding objective of the South African 
Reserve Banle In effect, it is possible to have a target-friendly inflation rate for a 
length of time despite monetary policy that is ambiguous and encourages 
unpredictability in market interest rates. However, persistent policy opaqueness can, 
over time, damage a favourable inflation scenario. For instance, if the public is unsure 
about the Reserve Bank's desired inflation target, price setting in the wage and goods 
markets may eventually produce an inflation outcome that is higher than the Bank 
may have intended. Rather, this study adjudicates the effectiveness of monetary policy 
within the context of policy transparency, which is an intrinsic part of the inflation-
targeti ng framework. 
The study looks at the extent to which monetary policy transparency has enhanced 
both the anticipatory nature of the market' s response to policy actions and the force 
that policy has on all interest rates in the financial system, particularly long-term 
rates. These concepts are important because through the transmission mechanism of 
monetary policy, the more deft market participants are at anticipating future Reserve 
Bank policy the greater the Bank's ability to steady the economy before the actual 
policy event. 
With the aid of regression models to estimate the response of market rates to policy 
changes, the results show that there is significant movement in market rates in 
anticipation of policy action, rather than on the day of the event or the day after. 
Indeed, the estimates for market rates movement on the day of and even the day after 
the policy action are generally minute. For instance, the R157 long-term government 
bond yield changes by a significant 41 basis points in response to a one percentage 
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point change in the Reserve Bank's benchmark repo rate in the period between the 
last policy action and the day preceding the current action. In contrast, the R157 bond 
yield changes by an insignificant 2 basis points on the day of the current repo rate 
change and about 1 basis point the day after the current change. 
The results point to a robust relationship between policy transparency and the 
market's ability to foresee rate action. If this were not the case, it is likely that there 
would be persistent market surprise and, hence, noticeable movement in interest rates 
on the day of the rate action and perhaps even the day after. Another important 
observation is that monetary policy impacts significantly on both short- and long-term 
market rates. Again, certifying the robustness of monetary policy under the inflation-
targeting regime. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
It is common for the public to assess the government on the execution of its mandate 
and, by extension, individual ministers on the di scharge of their duties. The South 
African Reserve Bank, though, is rarely included in such judgement.' Moreover, it is 
about five years since the introduction of formal inflation targeting as an anchor for 
monetary policy in South Africa. Consequently, it is opportune to appraise the Bank 
on its conduct under this framework. 
Notably, though, this analysis is not concerned with the level of inflation, which itself 
can be a test of policy success or failure because it is the overriding objective of the 
Reserve Bank. In fact, it is possible to have an "in-target" inflation rate for some time 
even though conduct of monetary policy is ambiguous and encourages volatility in 
market interest rates. However, persistent policy opaqueness can, over time, damage a 
favourable inflation scenario. For instance, if the public is unsure about the Reserve 
Bank's desired inflation target, price setting in the wage and goods markets may 
eventually produce an inflation outcome that is higher than the Bank may have 
intended. Rather, this study adjudicates the effectiveness of monetary policy within the 
context of policy transparency, which is an intrinsic part of the inflation-targeting 
framework. 
South Africa's monetary policy framework has evolved noticeably in recent decades, 
and it has been the task of the Reserve Bank to craft a system that is increasingly 
transparent. This is particularly the case with the adoption of inflation targeting. By 
the nature of this framework it would be expected that surprise policy events occur 
infrequently, if at all. 
I See e.g. Mail & Guardian (2004: 4-15) and The Star (2004: 16-17). 
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Although remarking on US policy, there is generic applicability to the comments of 
Poole et al. (2002: 85). They note that the US Federal Reserve is only able to affect 
longer-term rates by shaping market participants' expectations of the future Federal 
funds target rate, and the deeper into the future the market can predict target funds 
rate changes, all being equal, the greater will be the matching changes in longer-term 
rates. The import is that anticipatory responses by market participants to policy 
events begin to steady the economy well in advance of the actual policy actions. 
It is consistent then that an understanding of Reserve Bank' s reaction function is 
essential in the private sector's anticipation of future policy. It is likely that there will 
a be common mind-set between the monetary authorities and the private sector if the 
latter is aware of and understands the variables the Reserve Bank gauges to shape 
policy, and if there is certainty in the market' s comprehension of the inflation-
targeting specifications. That the Reserve Bank is viewed as credible is also germane. 
Moreover, this is relevant not just as regards the monetary policy, but expressly so in 
the context of the complete macroeconomy. 
Lucas (1976) noted the application of rational expectations to macroeconomic models 
and the interdependence of policymakers and the economy. He contended that the 
private sector fashions expectations of the dynamic feedback rule that the authorities 
pursue to effect policy. "Surprise" policy events and even unforeseen inaction by the 
authorities is more likely when policy is opaque. In contrast, increased transparency 
by the authorities yields less opportunity for unanticipated intercession such as a 
surprise reflation stance, for instance. Poole et al. (2002: 66), writing on the efficient 
market hypothesis, note: "if markets are efficient, anticipated policy actions are 
already reflected in economic variables - markets respond only to unexpected policy 
actions". 
It is against this backdrop that this study appraises the effectiveness of monetary 
policy in terms of the contribution of heightened policy transparency. In so doing, the 
study is able to judge whether the Reserve Bank is a stabilising rather than capricious 
force in the economy. 
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1.2 OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY 
It is possible to appraise the effectiveness of monetary policy and the extent of policy 
transparency by analysing the relationship between changes in the monetary stance 
and the response of market interest rates. Ideally, the increase in monetary policy 
transparency should reduce the element of surprise in the Reserve Bank's actions and 
therefore enhance the ability of market participants to correctly anticipate future 
policy events. 
Consequently, this study's contribution is to assess, firstly, whether the Reserve Bank 
under the inflation-targeting regime has become transparent to the extent that policy 
actions spawn little or no interest rate volatility in the days surrounding the policy 
action. In other words, are Reserve Bank policy actions mostly anticipated? Or is 
there frequent surprise? 
Second, is there a significant relationship between policy actions and the response of 
all market interest rates, particularly long-term rates? For monetary policy to be 
potent, it must impact on all market interest rates to give effect to the transmission 
mechanism of monetary policy. Insofar as long-term rates are influenced by 
expectations of future short-term rates, policy transparency will enhance the market's 
ability to anticipate future short-term rate action and therefore "price" long-term rates 
in accordance with the Reserve Bank's goals. 
In terms of the methodology employed, the literature on the subject is considered to 
glean guidance on a framework to estimate the effectiveness of the Reserve Bank's 
monetary policy. In this respect, the impact of policy actions on market interest rates 
of various maturities is estimated over several phases. This is to ascertain the extent of 
anticipation in the response of the market to Reserve Bank action and the degree to 
which the market reacts to the actual event. 
In terms of a theoretical exposition, the expectations theory of monetary policy is 
examined. This paradigm states that monetary policy actions shape long-term rates 
through their impact on current short-term rates and market participants' expectations 
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of future short-term rates. This exposition is relevant insofar as this study empirically 
tests the impact of monetary policy on long-term rates through changes in the repo 
rate. 
The study uses both visual and empirical analysis and the sample starts with the 
implementation of inflation targeting in 2000 and ends after the most recent change in 
the Reserve Bank's repo rate in August 2004. This sample period was selected 
because it marks a structural break from the previous "eclectic" monetary policy 
framework pursued in the late 1990s and the explicit focus on M3 money supply prior 
to that. The inflation-targeting framework promotes increased transparency by the 
authorities that can alter the nature of the market' s response to policy changes relative 
to opaque monetary policy systems. 
1.3 LAYOUT OF THE STUDY 
This study is cast in seven chapters and is arranged as follows: Chapter two examines 
the broad objectives of monetary policy and describes the evolution of policy in South 
Africa over the last two decades. The inflation targeting framework employed by the 
Reserve Bank is examined with reference to the institutional framework and the 
extent to which the Bank is transparent about policy. 
Chapter three looks at the securities repurchase rate (repo rate) and the "transmission 
mechanism of monetary policy". The repo rate is the "price" at which the Reserve 
Bank provides liquidity to the banking system and through this process influences 
market interest rates with consequent impact on the economy. In other words, the 
Reserve Bank can tighten (an increase in the repo rate) or loosen (a reduction in the 
repo rate) monetary policy and the corresponding impact on market interest rates 
influences various economic variables, including inflation. The manner in which 
changes in the repo rate transmit through the economy with ultimate impact on output 
and inflation is called the transmission mechanism of monetary policy. Various 
"channels", of which five are documented, depict this mechanism. These include the 
interest rate channel, asset price charUlei , exchange rate channel, monetary and credit 
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aggregates channel and expectations channel. This chapter provides a comprehensive 
understanding of the role of monetary policy in the economy. 
Armed with this knowledge, chapter four examines the literature on the impact of 
monetary policy on market interest rates, and also the role that market expectations of 
future monetary policy play in shaping interest rates. These provide frameworks to 
develop and contextualise the study. 
Chapter five examines the correlation between the repo rate and variOUS market 
interest rates of short- and long-term maturity. This serves as a precursor to more 
rigorous analysis in estimating the relationship between the repo rate and market 
interest rates. 
Chapter six tests the extent of market anticipation of policy events. Regression 
estimates are put forth of the response of market rates to policy changes over several 
phases, covering anticipatory movement, movement on the day of the policy change 
and movement the day after the policy action. Further, the significance of the 
association between monetary policy actions and market interest rates across the 
maturity spectrum is estimated. Regression models for various short- and long-term 
interest rate instruments are presented. 
Chapter seven concludes the study. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
MONETARY POLICY IN SOUTH AFRICA 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
It is commonly agreed that stability in the general price level is a vital prerequisite to 
fostering sustainable economic growth. In essence, this is the primary concern of 
monetary policy. However, as Van der Merwe (2004: I) notes, economists differ on 
the most effective method for securing this intent. 
South Africa has employed various frameworks to achieve low and stable inflation 
growth over the last two decades. This chapter reviews these approaches and details 
the purpose of monetary policy more generally. 
2.2 MONETARY POLICY OBJECTIVES 
Monetary policy involves the systems and measures embraced by a central bank to 
achieve a desired objective or set of objectives. The primary goal of monetary policy 
in most countries is price stability (Loayza and Schrnidt-Hebbel, 2002:1). This may 
involve configuring monetary policy in order to achieve a specified pace of annual 
growth in the general price level from month to month, or an annual average rate of 
growth that is within a specified range. 
In addition to stability in the general price level, central banks' mandate may also 
include full employment, management of foreign exchange payments, fund raising for 
government and financial stability. However, the attainment of price stability is 
generally pre-eminent, and usually articulated in the laws governing the central bank. 
Such laws typically attest to the political endorsement of the importance of price 
stability as a means to superior long-term sustainable economic growth. 
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External and local forces that may derail the prescribed policy objectives shape 
monetary policy. Consequently, the authorities will respond to these deviations in 
macroeconomic variables by reorganising their policy instrument; this may be a 
monetary or bank credit aggregate or a short-term interest rate. In turn , these tools 
alter economic behaviour through a multitude of transmission mechanisms to secure 
the policy objectives. 
2.3 MONETARY POLICY IN SOUTH AFRICA IN THE LAST 
TWO DECADES 
In the latter part of the 1980s, South Africa's monetary policy was tied to the pace of 
change in domestic M3 money supply. Targets for M3 were announced for the first 
time in the latter part of 1985, for the period starting in the final quarter of that year. 
Subsequently, M3 target rates or "guidelines" were announced in the first quarter of 
every year until 1999 (see Figure 2.1). 
Figure 2.1 M3 money supply growth in South Africa and Reserve Bank target 
ranges, 1980-2003 
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Source: South African Reserve Bank, Quarterly Bullelin December 2004, pg S-24; Smal and De Jager 
(2001: 3) 
However, globally and domestically, the relationship between the growth rate of 
money supply and inflation had become increasingly unhinged in the 1990s, amid 
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liberalising financial markets and financial sector deepening. Further, the changing 
international environment was eroding the force of monetary policy on the general 
price level and this had become increasingly relevant in light of South Africa's 
enlarged external trade and capital orientation following the isolation during the 
apartheid years (Smal and De Jager, 2001: 2). 
Van der Merwe (2004: 1) notes that the process of targeting money supply was a 
feature of informal inflation targeting, in that concerted focus was placed on 
achieving price stability, albeit without specific time frames. Moreover, the informal 
nature of this framework lay in that it constituted a transitional anchor, subsequently 
replaced by a broader indicator set. 
With the fading relevance of broad money supply as a robust indicator of inflation, 
South African Reserve Bank Governor Chris Stals in 1997 specified that the Bank's 
inflation risk monitor would include private bank credit provision, liquidity in the 
banking system, the level of the yield curve, the value of the rand and official foreign 
reserves, and prevailing and forecast inflation (Smal and De Jager, 2001: 3). 
Understandably, this approach is labelled "eclectic". 
Nonetheless, formal inflation targeting had become increasingly in vogue during this 
time, following its genesis in New Zealand in the early 1990s. Soon thereafter, 
Australia, Canada, Brazil, Mexico, Chile, Sweden and the United Kingdom also 
subscribed to this construction. South Africa officially adopted this policy framework 
as an anchor for monetary policy on 23 February 2000. 
The shift to formal inflation targeting in South Africa did not signal the supreme 
failure of previous regimes. Indeed, domestic headline consumer inflation had 
decelerated from close to 20% in the late 1980s to single digits about a decade later 
(see Figure 2.2). Further, about the tum of the millennium headline consumer 
inflation had subsided to about 5%. In 1999, the year preceding the formal adoption of 
the inflation-targeting framework, headline consumer prices grew at an annual rate of 
5.3%. 
1-
9 
Figure 2.2 Headline consumer inflation (CPI) in South Africa, 1980-2003 
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Source: Statistics South Africa (Statistical release POI41_I) 
Still, despite this achievement, Van der Merwe (2004: I) cites four reasons for the 
shift to a formal inflation-targeting course: 
I. On occasion, the informal targeting method fostered doubt about the Reserve 
Bank's monetary stance. For instance, the monetary aggregates were above 
proposed guidelines for protracted periods during the 1990s. Consequently, 
the public anticipated monetary tightening. However, this did not materialise 
due to the Bank's view that structural transformation in the economy was 
elevating the aggregates and, hence, did not warrant a conservative stance. 
2_ Inflation targeting allows for better synchronisation between monetary and 
other economic policies, so long as the target is congruent with other goals. By 
its very nature, the structured decision-making procedure embedded in the 
process promotes improved coordination. Basically, a collective "buy-in" by 
all stakeholders increases the framework's likelihood of success. 
3 _ Inflation targeting allows for a more considered approach to policy and 
elevates the Reserve Bank's accountability. Insofar as the Bank' s mandate is 
clear and widely understood, it is obliged to account for digression from the 
target and be transparent in its assessment of policy-shaping variables. The 
Bank, therefore, is constrained from acting beyond its mandate and will seek 
to inform the public about its methods. 
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4. Inflation targeting has the potential to shape inflation expectations. This is a 
function of the credibility of the framework and can bear positively on price 
setting in the goods and wage markets, for instance. 
Mboweni (1999: 400) captured the Reserve Bank' s predisposition towards inflation 
targeting by asserting that it "should minimise the social and economic cost of 
achieving price stability". Further, Van den Heever (2001: 176) noted that insofar as 
inflation targeting guides policies and expectations, it can lessen the "frictional costs" 
related to combating inflation. 
2.4 INFLATION TARGETING SYSTEMS 
Notably, inflation targeting is not singular in its style of execution. Carare and Stone 
(2003: 3-4) point to three regimes: "Full-fledged inflation targeting", "eclectic 
inflation targeting" and "inflation targeting lite". 
Full.jledged inflation targeting encompasses an unequivocal and institutionalised 
commitment by the authorities to the inflation target. The transparent monetary policy 
process that this engenders, in turn, encourages the central bank' s accountability to 
the target. Countries that employ this framework have a "medium to high level of 
credibility", and also pursue a universal approach to information in formulating 
policy. New Zealand was the first country to implement this regime, in 1989. 
Eclectic inflation targeting allows the authorities the flexibility to pursue pnce 
stability in addition to other policy objectives, such as economic growth. This arises 
primarily because of the substantial credibility of its inflation record and confidence 
in financial stability that allows for the maintenance of price stability, even in the 
absence of total transparency and accountability regarding the inflation target. Carare 
and Stone (2003: 3) cite the European Central Bank and the United States Federal 
Reserve as examples of banks that pursue this framework. 
II 
Inflation targeting lile is the weakest inflation-targeting regime, and accords with a 
situation where the central bank bas low credibility and is unable to pursue price 
stability as its pre-eminent goal. It usually applies to economies that have weak 
institutional capacity and are susceptible to economic and financial instability. 
Of the three regimes listed, South Africa subscribes to the full-fledged inflation 
targeting model. However, even within this classification there is variation in the 
manner of implementation among countries pursuing this system. For instance, 
differences may relate to who defines the targets, their definition, the policy decision-
making process, and the extent of policy transparency and accountability. 
2.5 THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK AND TARGET 
DESCRIPTION IN SOUTH AFRICA 
In South Africa, the Reserve Bank is an autonomous institution in terms of the 
Constitution where the Bank's executive management is charged with achieving its 
central mandate. However, the Bank consults frequently with the Minister of Finance 
in the context of routine safeguarding of the law. 
The South African Government determines the inflation target in consultation with 
the Reserve Bank. However, the Bank has instrument independence in achieving its 
mandate. This method allows for a greater policy consistency in pursuing various 
objectives, such as low inflation, increased output and jobs, but also "insulates the 
Reserve Bank from political pressures in the pursuance of its objective of price 
stability" (Van der Merwe, 2004: 4). 
The Reserve Bank targets a mildly altered variant of the comprehensive and publicly 
accepted headline consumer price index; that is, mortgage interest payments are 
excluded from the broad indicator. The resultant measure is labelled CPIX (see Figure 
2.3). Without this exclusion, changes in the Reserve Bank's policy rate, which 
directly influence mortgage interest payments, will have a perverse impact on 
headline inflation. In other words, the Bank may wish to raise its policy rate because 
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of increased inflation risk, but the very act of tightening policy will itself elevate the 
measured rate of inflation because of the lift in mortgage interest rates. 
Figure 2.3 Consumer inflation less mortgage interest rates (CPIX) and 3% to 6% 
inflation target range, 1998-2005 
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Source: Statistics South Africa (Statistical release POI4I . I). South African Reserve Bank 
The geographical coverage of CPIX includes the metropolitan and urban areas of 
South Africa_ The Reserve Bank has elected to exclude rural areas from CPIX 
because the methodology behind its estimation does not reflect actual prices in these 
areas; they are calculated by applying rural expenditure pattern weights to the prices 
surveyed in major towns. Also, national CPIX is a relatively recent construct, which 
limits its usefulness. 
A target range, as opposed to a single point or ceiling, is specified for application in 
South Africa. Each of these conditions has particular merits and drawbacks, and a 
central bank's choice ultimately reflects a trade-off2 A target range was considered 
most suitable for domestic application as it provides the authorities with some 
discretion and flexibility in the event of unanticipated price shocks (Mboweni, 1999: 
407). 
2 See Van der Merwe (2004) and Du Plessis (2003). The latter, in particular, draws attention to the 
weakness in inflation targeting originating from the focus on a band rather than a point target, and also 
the specification of an annual average in place of a defined horizon target. Admittedly, the initial 
annual average specification adopted by the Reserve Bank was relinquished in November 2003, in 
favour of a continuous target. 
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In February 2000, an annual average rate of growth in CPIX for calendar years 2002 
and 2003 within a 3% to 6% target zone was specified. The target range would then 
be adjusted to 3% and 5% in 2004 and 2005. This was later changed back to 3% and 
6% because following the sharp devaluation in the external value of the rand in 2001 
and its generally weak levels in 2002, it was evident that the target range would be 
missed. 
A further alteration was introduced in November 2003, when a continuous target of 
3% to 6% replaced the annual average clause. This meant that the Reserve Bank 
would attempt to keep the year-on-year CPIX growth rate within the 3% to 6% band 
in every month for the foreseeable future. The motivation for this change stemmed 
from the view that the original specification could spawn policy inconsistencies 
originating from disproportionate interest rate volatility and unsuccessful management 
of inflation expectations. 
Van der Merwe (2004: 6) notes that the new target specification does not imply that 
monetary policy will always respond should inflation move out of the target range. 
Rather, if the breach is forecast to be only brief, policy will not react. In the instance 
where inflation is predicted to be out of the target range for a prolonged period, the 
policy stance will be altered. Essentially, the Reserve Bank's policy response, even if 
it is inaction, is scripted on the expected future inflation trend and not the prevailing 
inflation rate. 
2.6 THE MONETARY POLICY COMMITTEE 
The monetary policy stance is shaped by the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC), 
which was established prior to the implementation of inflation targeting and met for 
the first time on l3 October 1999. Initially, meetings were held every six to eight 
weeks but in early 2002 the frequency of meetings was changed to quarterly to 
correspond with the publication of the Reserve Bank' s Quarterly Bulletin. This did 
not exclude the possibility of unscheduled meetings if events warranted them. 
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In June 2003, the frequency of MPC gatherings was agam altered, allowing for a 
narrower interval of approximately two months; hence, the MPC now has six 
scheduled meetings a year. The MPC meetings, usually held over two days, involve 
an in-depth appraisal of numerous global and domestic variables that have a direct or 
even remote bearing on the domestic price level. Econometric models also aid the 
policy formulation. In the final analysis, though, judgement is based on all available 
evidence. 
Van der Merwe writes (2004: 7) that while the Reserve Bank is centrally concerned 
with achieving the inflation target, it is sensitive to the risk that myopic focus on the 
target could lead to unwelcome consequences in the economy. Consequently, the 
MPC is not averse to showing discretion in its policy formulation if its actions can 
potentially foster instability amid unusual circumstances. For instance, in the event of 
an exogenous shock to the economy a vigorous monetary response aimed at 
containing inflation may engender extensive loss in output and employment. Under 
such conditions, the MPC would show prudence and be aware that consistent out-of-
target inflation outcomes would damage the credibility of the inflation-targeting 
framework and, therefore, the ability to lower inflation expectations meaningfully. 
The inflation-targeting framework initially incorporated an "escape clause", which 
allowed for the influence of exogenous shocks that rendered attainment of the target 
unlikely. However, because this clause fostered ambiguity in articulating policy, it 
was replaced with an "explanation clause" in November 2003.3 The Reserve Bank is 
now obliged to disclose to the public the nature of any exogenous inflation risk and 
the resulting policy stance that will allow inflation to return to the target and over 
what horizon. 
3 "Against the backdrop of reformulating the target as a continuous target, the escape clause is 
reformulated as an "explanation clause" . When the economy is buffeted by a supply side shock similar 
to those envisaged by the original escape clause that will take CPIX outside the target range (e.g. an oil 
price shock, a drought, a natural disaster, or a financial contagion affecting the currency), at the 
subsequent meeting of the Monetary Policy Committee, the Reserve Bank will inform the public ofthe 
nature of the "shock", the anticipated impact on CPIX inflation and the monetary policy response to 
ensure that inflation returns to the target and the time over which this will occur" (National Treasury, 
2003: 31). 
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2.7 POLICY TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
Woodford (2004: 3) notes that since the mid-1990s there has been a sharp rise in the 
self-awareness of central banks regarding the explicitness of their public 
communications about policy choices and its determinants. In this respect, inflation 
targeting as a monetary policy approach has proven crucial in that it proffers the 
central bank a platform to explain its conduct by virtue of a systematic decision-
making framework. 
In South Africa, the evolution to an inflation-targeting system has enhanced the 
transparency and accountability of monetary policymakers. Communications are 
frequent and take the form of published commentary as well as discussion forums 
where the public may engage with the authorities on issues pertaining to policy. 
The Monetary Policy Review, published biannually, is perhaps the most 
comprehensive Reserve Bank publication articulating the risks to inflation and, hence, 
monetary policy. It includes the fan chart, which is the Reserve Bank's CPIX 
projection presented in the context of varying probabilities (see Figure 2.4). The fan 
chart comprises confidence intervals reflecting varying degrees of certainty for 
forecasted CPIX inflation. It is a central piece of information guiding the public on 
the likely course of monetary policy, although, as indicated earlier, it must be viewed 
alongside other data and inflation risks. 
The explicit and publicly known technical specifications of the inflation-targeting 
framework raise the Reserve Bank's level of accountability. Moreover, the Reserve 
Bank is obliged to account to the Minister of Finance and Parliament on the 
implementation of its inflation targeting mandate. The Minister of Finance also has 
the power to compel the Reserve Bank to comply with the provisions of the Reserve 
Bank Act, should he perceive its failure to have done so. 
.. 
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Figure 2.4 Reserve Bank's CPIX forecast (fan chart) as at November 20044 
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2.8 CONCLUSION 
It is generally agreed that monetary policy is centrally concerned with the delivery of 
low and stable inflation. In this regard, South Africa has had laudable success over the 
last two decades. The adoption of inflation targeting in 2000 was a further step in 
employing a more robust framework to secure this end. 
This chapter has highlighted the form and style of inflation targeting and the public 
participatory nature of the framework. The latter has lent improved transparency and 
accountability to monetary policy and also the ability of the public to better anticipate 
changes in the Reserve Bank's stance. As a result, it would be expected that the 
interest rate market would show little, if any, volatility when there is a policy change 
or even inaction by the Reserve Bank. This would imply that market participants have 
a deep and comprehensive understanding of the Reserve Bank's objectives and 
methods of operation. 
4 The fan diagram employs confidence bands to illustrate varying degrees of certainty. The central and 
darkest band shows the most probable CPIX forecast. A slightly lighter-shaded band is added on either 
side of the middle band and adds an additional 10% probability to the forecast. This exercise is 
repeated until the entire shaded area exhibits a 90% confidence interval (South African Reserve Bank, 
2001b: 33). 
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The following chapter discusses the role the securities repurchase rate plays in the 
operation of monetary policy, and also how changes in this rate impact the economy 
by virtue of the "transmission mechanism of monetary policy". 
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CHAPTER THREE 
REPO RATE AND MONETARY POLICY 
TRANSMISSION MECHANISM 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter provides an exposition of the elements that give effect to monetary 
policy. These include the Reserve Bank's securities repurchase system, commonly 
referred to as the repo system, and the mechanism through which monetary policy is 
transmitted through the economy. 
Reference to these subjects is important because they are essentially the vehicles that 
allow for the expression of monetary policy. In other words, they act as the 
connection between the Reserve Bank's policy choices and the resulting impact on 
real and financial variables in the economy. 
3.2 THE REPO SYSTEM 
The Reserve Bank participates in the domestic money market in order to implement 
the MPC's stance and to satisfy banks ' liquidity requirements. In this vein, the 
Reserve Bank adds to the stability of the collective banking system. 
The foundation of this process is that the Reserve Bank holds sway over the supply of 
funds in the interbank market due to its role as ultimate liquidity provider to the 
banking system. This occurs in that the Reserve Bank shapes the level of the interest 
rates at which the demand for and supply of funds is balanced. As a result, the 
Reserve Bank has direct influence on short-term rates in the money market and acts as 
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the genesis of all interest rates in the financial system. It is by this means that the 
Bank impacts on the economy generally and on inflation specifically. 
The central carrier for the transmission of monetary policy in South Africa is the 
Reserve Bank's securities repurchase rate, generally called the repo rate. 
3.2.1 Development of the repo system 
This repo system was initiated in March 1998 by the Reserve Bank as a mechanism to 
generate increased flexibility in the domestic financial market adjustment process. At 
the time it was envisaged that liquidity provision would occur through repurchase 
transactions at a variable interest rateS (the repo rate). 
The system recognised the need that against the backdrop of the increased 
interconnectedness of global financial markets and heightened capital mobility, policy 
instruments must be able to respond speedily and delicately to underlying financial 
market conditions. This would allow for more effective safeguarding or restoration of 
equilibrium in the local market. Stals (1998: 2) noted that "interest rates, exchange 
rates and financial asset prices must be flexible, and must not be constrained by rigid 
monetary policy controls." 
The Reserve Bank conceived that in contrast to the previous discount window or 
overnight loan facility, the repo mechanism would constantly signal the Bank's policy 
objectives through frequent disclosure of the amount of liquidity it was willing to 
make available to banking institutions daily. As a result, the system allowed for a 
more transparent signalling of the Reserve Bank' s policy intentions to the market and 
thereby raised the Bank's effectiveness. 
However, while the Reserve Bank intended that the market should provide daily 
signals about underlying liquidity conditions that would appropriately influence the 
, A variable rate means that the repo rate can change daily depending on the imbalance between the 
demand for and supp ly of liquidity. In this context, the repo rate can change frequently and 
independently of MPC meetings. A fixed rate implies that repo rate adjustments occur at the behest of 
the MPC and by a margin determined by the committee. 
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repo rate, the system proved less effective than anticipated, primarily because of 
inefficiencies in the interbank market. The result was that the repo rate did not always 
reflect market conditions and monetary policy signals sometimes appeared 
ambiguous. 
Consequently, during 2000 and early 2001 the Reserve Bank alternated between a 
variable and fixed repo rate, noting that the latter resulted in greater stability in the 
domestic money market. On 17 March 2001, the Reserve Bank informed the private 
banks of its desire to formally move to a fixed repo system and, further, that it would 
lower the repo rate by 100 basis points purely as a technical adjustment to enhance 
the effectiveness of its accommodation system. The adjustment was effected on 6 
September 2001 6 
In June 2004, the Reserve Bank announced that it was re-examining its domestic 
money market operations and the functioning of the money market more generally 
(South African Reserve Bank, 2004a). Following discussions and a survey among 
participating counterparties, the Reserve Bank presented a consultation paper in 
December 2004, for which responses were to be lodged with the Bank by 31 January 
2005. 
While the Reserve Bank notes that there is no glaring weakness in monetary policy 
practices since the modifications effected in September 2001 , more recent 
developments, such as the closure of the Bank's oversold foreign exchange forward 
book in February 2004, necessitate reassessment.7 
6 For details on this and other changes to the Reserve Bank's operational procedures in the money 
market proposed during this time, see South AtTican Reserve Bank (200Ia). 
7 The consultative paper explains: "For some years up until 2003, a huge structural money market 
surplus first needed to be drained in order to create a meaningful liquidity requirement in the domestic 
market. The liquidity overhang was largely associated with losses encountered (at times) on the 
Reserve Bank's oversold foreign exchange forward position (forward book). The subsequent 
expansionary impact on money market liquidity was neutralised through various so called "open 
market operations" namely: Reserve Bank debentures, long term reverse repa transactions, foreign 
exchange swaps and money market foreign exchange swaps with counter dollar deposits, which at one 
stage reached a level of more than R50 billion. The structural surplus has declined substantially in 
recent months owing mainly to: the partial sett lement of the Gold and Foreign Exchange Contingency 
Reserve account (GFECRA) by the National Treasury; the outright selling of securities tTom the 
Reserve Bank's portfolio; as well as the recovery in the exchange rate of the rand which generated 
profits on the forward book. The oversold foreign exchange forward position was squared-off in 
February 2004 which means that the forward book will no longer be an important factor in liquidity 
management. In the past, it has often complicated the banks' own liquid ity calculations because they 
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The proposed modifications are aimed at: 
• streamlining the Reserve Bank's refinancing operations to render them more 
simple and transparent; 
• raising the responsibility of banks m managmg their respective liquidity 
requirements, and thus test their credit-worthiness in the market with 
regularity; and 
• deepen and encourage more liquid markets through enhanced trading among 
money market participants. This is aimed at strengthening South Africa's 
financial architecture through better price discovery and competition in the 
money market. 
3.2.2 Mechanics of the repo system 
The Reserve Bank acts as banker for private banks and the repo rate is the interest rate 
at which the Bank lends short-term funds to the banks. The repo rate is designed to 
directly shape short-term money market rates and rates across the full maturity 
spectmm of quotes. 
The Reserve Bank acts as lender of last resort in that it satisfies banks ' daily cash 
shortfall or liquidity needs (South African Reserve Bank, 2004b: 2-3). A formal 
system, labelled the repurchase transaction system, allows banks to borrow funds 
from the Reserve Bank. Basically, the repo method entails the temporary provision of 
cash by the lender, in this instance the Reserve Bank, in exchange for a financial asset 
sold by the borrower, the bank. The transaction is impermanent in that it is subject to 
the borrower repurchasing the financial asset at a c,ontracted future time, presently one 
week. The interest rate at which the Reserve Bank lends to the banks is the repo rate -
quoted as a rate per annum - and is determined by the MPC. 
could not reliably determine what amounts of liquidity would be drained by the Reserve Bank in order 
to sterilise the expansions related to the losses on the forward book. Having dealt with this important 
structural constraint, the Reserve Bank feels that it can introduce measures which it believes wi ll 
encourage banks to take more responsibi lity for managing their own individual liquidity needs" (South 
African Reserve Bank, 2004a: 8-9). 
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Ihe repo rate functions as the key gauge for the level of short-term market interest 
rates. For instance, should the Reserve Bank raise the repo rate, the cost of bank 
funding sourced through the repo system increases, thus eroding the existing profit 
margin. Banks, in turn, respond by raising their deposit and lending rates, which 
precipitates a collective rise in interest rates. This tempers the demand for credit-
sensitive goods and services thereby lowering inflation. In all, these activities of the 
Reserve Bank capture the formulation and functioning of monetary policy (South 
African Reserve Bank, 2004b: 2-3). 
It is the desire of the Reserve Bank that the repo system, and by implication the repo 
rate, be effective. To this end, the Bank compels the private banks to borrow a 
sizeable amount of liquidity from it. This is referred to as the "liquidity requirement" 
(see Figure 3.1). 
Figure 3_1 Liquidity provided by the Reserve Bank through the main repurchase 
auction, 2000-2004 
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Source: South African Reserve Bank, Quarterly Bulletin December 2004, pg S-26 
To generate this shortage, the Reserve Bank frequently intervenes in the money 
market and it does this by draining excess liquidity through "open market" operations. 
The instruments to effect this are Reserve Bank debentures, longer-term reverse repos 
and foreign exchange swaps. Further, this shortage is supplemented by levying a cash 
r 
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reserve requirement on banks, which IS referred to as the "structural liquidity 
requirement" . 
The Reserve Bank's monetary policy implementation mechanism can be depicted as 
follows (South African Reserve Bank, 2004c: 1): 
Cash reserve Liquidity Reserve Banks adjust 
requirement requirement Bank their interest 
---. 
(shortage) in 
---. 
provides 
---. 
rates 
Other open- the money liquidity at according to 
market market the repo rate changes in 
operations the repo rate 
Source: South African Reserve Bank 
The repo rate, through its impact on market interest rates, has a bearing on numerous 
real and financial variables of the economy, with consequent impact on the demand 
and provision of goods and services. The resulting imbalances, in turn, influence 
domestic inflation. 
In summary, the Reserve Bank, in its role as banker to private banks, plays a central 
role as ultimate provider of liquidity to the financial system at the repo rate. Through 
this process the Bank bears directly on market interest rates. 
As a result, the repo rate, through its force on the full maturity spectrum of interest 
rates, impacts on numerous real and financial variables of the market, and ultimately 
on inflation. The system through which this occurs is called the monetary policy 
transmission mechanism, and is explained in the next section. 
3.3 TRANSMISSION MECHANISM OF MONETARY POLICY 
Figure 3.2 captures the essence of the monetary policy rules and relay mechanisms. 
Smal and De Jager (2001: 5) explain that the principal tool for monetary policy is the 
repo rate. This instrument impacts on the balance of demand for and supply of goods 
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and services in the economy through a multitude of variables or channels. These 
include market interest rates, exchange rates, the demand for credit, other asset prices 
and market participants ' proclivity for spending and investment. Critically, the 
balance of demand relative to output capacity bears strongly on inflation, which is 
also shaped, among others, by forces in the labour market and import prices through 
the exchange rate. 
Figure 3.2 Monetary policy transmission in South Africa 
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The transmission mechanism impacts on the economy at varying speeds. The interval 
between the change in the repo rate and its impact on final inflation may be lengthy, 
and differs among countries and also, sometimes, within a single economy under 
changed circumstances. Smal and De Jager (2001: 6) note that that the lag between a 
change in central bank stance and its impact on inflation is usually between 12 and 24 
months, with the complete impact occurring over at least two years. However, 
financial market development and external linkages may alter the transmission time. 
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As noted above, the transmission mechanism impacts the economy through various 
channels and markets. The literature shows that there are essentially five conduits of 
monetary policy transmission; the following exposition draws from extensively 
Mishkin (1995): 
1. Interest rate channel 
2. Asset price channel 
3. Exchange rate channel 
4. Monetary and credit aggregates 
5. Expectations channel 
In South Africa, a small open economy with a flexible exchange rate regime 
employing inflation targeting, the traditional interest rate and exchange rate channels 
are found to be the most pertinent transmission mechanisms.8 Nonetheless, the above 
five channels are briefly explained below. 
3.3.1 Interest rate channel 
This mechanism has been a standard feature in economics literature for more than 50 
years, and is a central tenet in the basic Keynesian textbook model (Mishkin, 1995: 
4). 
The fo llowing illustration articulates this channel: 
(3. 1) 
where M is money supply, i is the real interest rate, / is investment and Y is output. 
8 Arcn and Muellbauer (2002, in Loayyza and Schmidt-Hebbel, 2002: 9- 10) estimate simple structural 
equations to identi fy the primary transmission mechanism of monetary policy in South Africa. They 
find the interest rate and exchange rate channels to be the main transmission mechanisms of monetary 
policy. 
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M..J.- denotes a tightening in monetary policy that encourages higher real interest rates 
(i i). In tum, the resultant increase in the cost of capital causes investment spending 
to decline (l..J.-), leading to a decrease in aggregate demand and production (Y ..J.-). 
The logic ofthis proposition is equally applicable to household spending in relation to 
real estate and durable goods. Expenditure on these items may be viewed as 
households' investment. Consequently, tight monetary policy (M J,) fosters an 
increase in longer-term real interest rates (i t) that, in turn, curtails outlays by 
households on real estate and durable goods (I ..J.-). The resultant fall in aggregate 
demand ultimately impacts aggregate output (Y ..J.-) and prices, the latter through 
changes in the output gap. 
It is obvious from the above that if monetary policy is to be potent, there must be a 
firm relationship between changes in the repo rate and the price of retail financial 
products. Accordingly, it is usual for South African banks to respond by adjusting 
their loan rates by the same amount as the adjustment in the repo rate, and with very 
little delay. Figure 3.3 shows a consistently firm relationship between the Reserve 
Bank's Bank ratelrepo rate on the one hand, and the fixed deposit and prime rate on 
the other. It is evident that the associations are fairly strong suggesting that monetary 
policy has force. 
Further, the relationship between household consumption, fixed investment and the 
real (inflation adjusted) prime rate is exhibited in Figure 3.4. What is apparent is the 
sway the real prime rate has on the growth in fixed investment and households' 
outlays. 
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Figure 3.3 Nominal interest rates in South Africa, 1980-2004 
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Figure 3.4 Real household consumption expenditure growth, real fixed 
investment growth and the real prime rate (deflated using headline consumer 
inflation), 1980-2004 
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3.3.2 Asset price channel 
There are a variety of asset prices that provide channels for monetary transmission. 
These include stocks, bonds, real estate and foreign exchange. The latter (explained in 
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section 3.3.3) is grouped separately because of its extraordinary features, while the 
former may be suitably clustered into the asset price channel. 
Monetarists argue that it is imperative to ascertain the effects of monetary policy on 
relative asset prices and real wealth. In this regard, Mishkin (1995: 5-6) notes two 
channels of monetary transmission that are deemed pertinent: 
• Tobin's q theory ofinvestment9; and 
• the effects on consumption of changes in wealth. 
Tobin describes q as firms' market value relative to the cost of replacing capital. A q 
value greater than 1 implies that the firm's market price exceeds the cost of replacing 
capital. In other words, machinery and equipment is cheap relative to the market value 
of the firm, and issuing expensive equity (from the buyer's perspective) to purchase 
cheap plant and equipment is enticing. Consequently, investment will rise as firms 
issue small amounts of script to accumulate large quantities of capital goods. 
Tobin's q principle allows monetary policy to impact the economy through its 
influence on stock market prices. The monetarist view holds that a fall in money 
supply forces the public to reduce spending in order to shore up cash balances. 
Spending directed to the stock market, therefore, may be a casualty of this preference, 
with the result that equity prices fall. 
The Keynesian slant sees a rise in interest rates as a product of tighter monetary 
policy, with the result that equities lose favour in place of bonds (Mishkin: 1995: 6). 
Consequently, equity prices decline. 
Schematically, equation 3.2 shows a decline in stock prices (Pe ,j..) as a result of 
monetary policy tightening (M,j.. ). This leads to a lower q (q ,j..) and, in turn, lower 
investment (l ,j..) and correspondingly output (Y .j.). 
9 q represents the ratio of the valuation stockholders place on a firm relative to the market value of its 
assets. The share price reflects the shareho lders ' valuation. at the margin. In theory. if q > I a firm 
should invest. If q < I the firm should run down or sell its capital stock. 
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(3.2) 
In regard to the wealth effect, Modigliani (1971 , in Mishkin, 1995: 6) contends that 
equities, aside from human capital, real capital and other financial wealth, comprise a 
substantial portion of individuals' accumulated wealth. Thus, when stock prices 
decline, consumption spending, which is a function of the lifetime resources of 
consumers, should fall. The outcome may also be labelled a "negative wealth effect". 
This, of course, would be opposite to a "positive wealth effect", where a rise in stock 
prices and/or other financial or real wealth raises consumers' propensity to consume. 
In the instance of a negative wealth shock, the mechanism of monetary policy 
transmission would be reflected by (equation 3.3) contractionary monetary policy (M 
.j,) which prompts lower stock prices (Pe .j,). The resultant slide in wealth (W .j,) spurs 
a drop in consumption (c..I-) and output (Y ..1-). 
(3.3) 
3.3.3 Exchange rate channel 
This mechanism transmits through both aggregate demand (equation 3.4) and supply 
(equation 3.5) linkages. On the former, Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995: 75) suggest that a 
fall in the domestic real interest rate (i .j,), resulting from increased money supply (M 
t), causes a real depreciation of the local currency (rand .j,) through the foreign 
interest parity condition. This results in a rise in net exports (NE t) and in aggregate 
demand (Y t). 
The demand leg is expressed as follows: 
Mt ~ i.j, ~ rand.j, ~ NE t ~ Yt. (3.4) 
On the supply leg, the local currency 's real depreciation increases import prices and, 
therefore, encourages inflation directly. Further, the elevated cost of imported inputs 
restrains aggregate supply, thereby constraining production and rai sing inflation. 
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The supply leg is depicted as follows: 
M t ~ i ,J, ~ rand,J, ~ input costs t ~ aggregate supply ,J, ~ y,J,. (3.5) 
Figure 3.5 shows the inverse relationship between the growth in net exports and the 
real prime rate. 
Figure 3.5 Net exports as percentage of gross domestic product and the real 
prime rate (deflated using headline consumer inflation), 1980-2004 
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Source: South African Reserve Bank. Quarterly Bulletin December 2004, pg S-28. S-117 and S-88; 
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3.3.4 Monetary and credit aggregates 
Classical monetarists underscore the role of credit and (narrow and broad) monetary 
aggregates in determining asset, goods and factor prices (Loayza and Schmidt-Hebbel 
2002: 5). These, in turn, bear on inflation. 
There are essentially two conduits of monetary transmission within credit markets: the 
bank lending channel and balance sheet channel (Mishkin 1995: 7). 
The bank lending channel stems from the special role played by banks in the financial 
system because of their deftness at engaging with certain types of borrowers, 
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principally small firms. In these circumstances the problems of asymmetric 
information can be especially large. In contrast, large firms have recourse to stock and 
bond markets and are not necessarily confined to bank intermediation. Consequently, 
a tightening monetary stance (M ,j,) that reduces bank reserves and bank deposits 
(bank deposits ,j,), impacts on loans to borrowers (bank loans ,j,), especially those with 
limited or no recourse to other credit markets. This, in tum, tempers investment (I ,j,) 
and output (Y ,j,). This concept is illustrated in equation 3.6. 
M ,j, ~ bank deposits ,j, ~ bank loans ,j, ~ J ,j, ~ Y ,j,. (3.6) 
Bernanke and Gertler (1995: 29) argue, though, that due to constant financial 
innovation and the diminishing role of banks in credit extension, the banks' lending 
role in monetary transmission is becoming less important. These authors emphasise 
the continued importance of the balance sheet channel as a mechanism for monetary 
transmission. 
This channel operates through the net worth of firms, and a lower net worth translates 
to lower lender collateral and, therefore, higher losses from adverse selection. As a 
result, a decline in firms' net worth, which elevates the adverse selection problem, 
leads to reduced lending to facilitate investment. Also, a decline in a firm' s net worth 
reduces the owners' equity interest, which may spur more risky investment activities. 
This heightens the moral hazard problem and lenders' concerns about loan repayment. 
Consequently, lending will be held back and investment retarded. 
Monetary policy can impact firms ' balance sheets in numerous ways. For instance, a 
tightening in policy (M ,j,), which weighs on equity prices (Pe ,j,), reduces firms' net 
worth and so leads to lower investment spending (J,j,) and aggregate demand (y,j,) 
due to the heightened adverse selection and moral hazard problems. The following 
schematic captures this balance sheet channel: 
M ,j, ~ Pe ,j, ~ adverse selection t and moral hazard t ~ lending ,j, ~ 
l,j, ~ y,j,. (3.7) 
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A further example rests on contractionary monetary policy that raises real interest 
rates and, by virtue of reduced cash flows, reduces the health of firms ' balance sheets. 
The following exhibit articulates this: 
M .j. => it => cash flow .j. => adverse selection t and moral hazard t => 
lending.j. => I .j. => y.j.. (3 .8) 
3.3.5 Expectations channel 
The expectations conduit entails private sector VIews about the future course of 
monetary policy and all future-related variables generally. 
According to Loayza and Schmidt-Hebbel (2002: 6), all variables that encompass an 
intertemporal dynamic and, hence, are shaped by a vision of the future are impinged 
on by market participants' outlook on impending shocks and the resulting monetary 
policy response. The exact mechanisms for the expectations conduit are intertemporal 
adaptations of the static interest rate, exchange rate, asset price and money and credit 
channels. 
3.4 CONCLUSION 
The Reserve Bank, in its role as ultimate liquidity provider, uses the repo rate as its 
benchmark instrument for influencing market interest rates. Consequently, through an 
assortment of relay mechanisms referred to as the transmission mechanism of 
monetary policy, numerous economic variables, including inflation, are affected. 
Doubts have been raised about the importance of some of the channels as meaningful 
transmission systems, with some commentators emphasizing some conduits and other 
analysts giving weight to others. IO However, this study is not concerned with 
adjudicating these contests. Rather, an examination of the various chalmels lends 
understanding about monetary rules and transmission mechanisms and, consequently, 
10 See Mishkin (I 995). 
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the capacity of the central bank to influence the economy through a tightening 
(increase in the repo rate) or loosening (lowering of the repo rate) of monetary policy. 
The next section reviews the literature covering the response of market interest rates 
to monetary policy actions. These studies show marked variability in market rates in 
reaction to monetary policy events. They also show the fading effect of monetary 
policy changes on market rates as the maturity profile of the instrument lengthens. 
The expectations theory of future monetary policy is then examined to aid 
understanding of the actual movements in market rates. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND EXPECTATIONS THEORY 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter contains two key contributions to the study. First, section 4.2 documents 
some of the literature that comments on the impact of central bank policy on market 
interest rates. Also, these studies provide a framework, used in chapter six, for 
estimating the impact of Reserve Bank policy actions on domestic interest rates. 
Second, section 4.3 introduces the role that expectations of future monetary policy 
plays in shaping market interest rates. This hypothesis asserts that expectations of 
future monetary policy can have a profound impact on market interest rates beyond 
the current central bank policy action. 
4.2 LITERATURE REVIEW: THE RESPONSE OF MARKET 
INTEREST RATES TO POLICY CHANGES 
There is a generous body of research documenting the impact of central bank policy 
on the full spectrum of interest rates in the financial system. The depth of these 
studies has grown as the nature of the financial markets and monetary policy itself has 
developed. However, many of the recent studies build on earlier work, as these remain 
relevant. Consequently, a mixture of older and more current sources has been 
considered in this study. 
Cook and Hahn (1988:5) estimated the one-day response of bond rates to changes in 
the US Federal funds target rate, and ran the following regression in their event study 
approach: 
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L'lR, = b I + b2L'lRFF, + u" (4 .1 ) 
where L'lRFF, represents the change in the Federal funds rate target and L'lR, the change 
in the bond rate on the day of the policy alteration. 
Their results, for the period September 1974 through September 1979, show that 
changes in US Federal Reserve policy had a strong impact on the short end of the US 
Treasury market but markedly less on the long end. Following a one percentage point 
rise in the Federal funds rate target, the 3-month Treasury bill rate would increase by 
50 to 55 basis points while the 20-year bond yield increased by about 10 basis points. 
The results were statistically significant at the I % level in the regressions, and the size 
of the coefficients were fairly stable across the Treasury bill rates and then weakened 
steadily through the 20-year bond rate. In closing, the authors note that policy changes 
by the US Federal Reserve prompted sizable movement in short-term rates, moderate 
movement in intermediate rates and small movement in the long end of the interest 
rate curve (Cook and Hahn, 1998: 12). 
Research by Roley and Sellon (1995 : 84), covering the period October 1987 through 
July 1995 and utilising a similar methodology to Cook and Hahn, reveals a weaker 
association between variation in the Federal Reserve's benchmark rate and market 
interest rates. They show that on the day of a one percentage point rise in the Federal 
funds rate target, the 30-year Treasury bond yield ri ses by a mere four basis points. 
However, these authors found some evidence that policy changes were anticipated, in 
contrast to Cook and Hahn in their examination covering an earlier period. 
Radecki and Reinhart (1994: 328-9) and Dale (1993 , in Roley and Sellon, 1995: 87) 
show similarly weak results as Roley and Sellon. The former covered the US market 
for the period June 1989 to September 1992. Dale measured the responses of the UK 
market to the policy actions of the Bank of England. In both studies, long-term rates 
increased by a mere four to ten basis points in response to a 100 basis points increase 
in the policy rate in the days surrounding the policy change. 
Kuttner (2000: 2) notes more sophisticated econometric work undertaken by Edelberg 
and Marshall (1996) to evaluate the weight of US Federal Reserve policy on the 
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market. Through the use of a vector autoregression (V AR) model, these authors focus 
on the unanticipated element of central bank actions and show a strong response from 
Treasury bill rates but a weak reaction from bonds rates. 
Poole et 01. (2002) considered not only the impact of policy changes on market 
interest rates but also inaction by the authorities; they analysed the degree to which 
the market was surprised by the US Federal Reserve not altering the funds target rate. 
The authors tender evidence that the market's ability to anticipate Federal Reserve 
action has been greatly bolstered by the trend towards enhanced transparency. 11 For 
example, their results show that the response of the 3-month Treasury bill is nearly 
identical before and after the shift to increased transparency in 1994. However, the 
scale and significance of the response of longer-term rates declines in the post-1994 
period. They explain that this may be because of increased communication by the 
Federal Reserve about its longer-term policy objectives. The authors also note that the 
market is able to anticipate policy changes further in advance because of greater 
transparency (Poole et 01. , 2002: 85). 
In summary, the literature provides evidence that the response of market interest rates 
to changes in the policy rate in the days surrounding the event grows weaker as the 
maturity of the interest rate instruments lengthen. However, more recent research, for 
instance Poole et of. (2002: 85), shows that along with the shift to heightened 
monetary policy transparency, market participants appear to be better able to foresee a 
shift in the central bank's stance so that the response of longer-term rates to the policy 
change is significant before the event but weak in the days surrounding the action. It 
is reasonable then to expect insignificant market response further out the yield curve 
on the day of the policy action if there is increasingly common mind-set between the 
central bank and the market, but significant response prior to the event. 
The following section introduces the expectations hypothesis and shows the potential 
for substantial variability in market interest rates, particularly long-term instruments. 
II See Poole and Rasche (2003: 1) for a chronology of the practices adopted by the US Federal Reserve 
since 1989. 
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4.3 EXPECTATIONS THEORY AND THE MONETARY 
TRANSMISSION MECHANISM 
The inflation expectations paradigm asserts that monetary policy actions shape long-
term rates through its impact on current short-term rates and the pricing of forward 
rates. This is linked to the idea that long-term rates equal the average of short-term 
rates and expected future short-term rates, and is refelTed to as the term structure of 
interest rates. According to this hypothesis, a long-term interest rate is the geometric 
average of the prevailing short-term rate and expected future short-term rates, which 
implies that rates will be priced so that an investor is indifferent between holding a 
long-term debt instrument and a series of short-term bonds covering the same 
maturity. Consequently, the volatility in the slope of the current yield curve must be 
systematically tied to ensuing changes in interest rates (Cook and Hahn, 1990: 1 ).12 
As a result, shifting expectations about initial policy and the likelihood of policy 
persistence may yield varying outcomes in forward rates, with resultant variability in 
long-term rates. The following examples, which borrow from Roley and Sellon (1995: 
78-79), lend insight to this hypothesis. The stylised model considers only the impact 
of current and projected policy actions on long-term rates, through their impact on 
forward rates, and abstracts other factors that may shape interest rates including term 
premia. 13 
12 The term structure of interest rates may be explained by the following example: an investor has a 
three-year investment horizon, and has the option of purchasing a I-year bond now, a second I-year 
bond in a year's time and a third I-year bond in two years' time. Alternatively, the investor could 
purchase a 3-year bond now. In the piecemeal option, suppose that the I-year bond is trading at an 
annualised yield of 7%, the I-year bond issued in a year's time is expected to trade at 8% and the 1-
year instrument issued in 2 years at 9%. Premised on the expectations theory, the yield on the 3-year 
bond will be 8%, the simple average of the current and anticipated future I-year yields. 
13 Rudebusch (1997: 3) notes that an investor contemplating a single long-term bond and a series of 
short-term instruments may demand a premium in the latter instance to compensate for the 
reinvestment risk associated with the periodic debt rollover. Consequently, a long-term bond should 
reflect an annualised yield that equates to the current and future short-term instruments plus a term 
premium, which may even be negative. Rudebusch highlights that an unobservable term premium that 
fluctuates over time complicates interpreting the term structure. This hindrance is accentuated over a 
longer investment horizon and the more rrequent the debt rollover. Other causes for variability in 
longer-term interest rates may relate to changes in the liquidity premium and default risk. The former 
relates to the discount the buyer wou ld seek from the seller due to the risk of low secondary market 
participation, for instance, while the latter relates to the credit-worthiness of the issuer. Neither of these 
is necessarily constant over time. 
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An investor has a four-year investment horizon, and the option of purchasing a 1-, 2-, 
3- or 4-year asset. In this simplified illustration, the I-year security characterizes a 
short-term bond, the 2- and 3-year bonds are medium-term instruments and the 4-year 
bond is a long-term asset. 
In the first instance (scenario 1, Figure 4.1), it is assumed that there is no immediate 
alteration in policy and market participants expect further that policy will remain 
unaltered over the four-year horizon. Assuming the prevailing I-year forward rate is 
8%, the anticipated stability in policy will yield a flat term structure where forward 
rates of all maturities price at 8%. 
Figure 4.1 Interest rate (bonds) responses to policy actions (five scenarios) 
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Scenario 2 in Figure 4.1 assumes that monetary policy is altered by a 1 percentage 
point increase in the policy rate, which also raises the current I-year rate by the same 
magnitude. Suppose further that market participants expect monetary policy will then 
remain stable over the investment horizon. As a result, in addition to the 1 percentage 
point rise in the current I-year rate, the one-, two- and three-year 1-year forward rates 
also rise by the same quantum. In other words, the term structure of interest rates, or 
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the yield curve, incurs a parallel shift. This reflects expectations that the I percentage 
point increase in the policy rate will be permanent throughout the investment horizon. 
Situation 3, like scenario 2, imitates a I percentage point rise in the policy rate with a 
resultant rise in the current I-year rate. However, now investors expect that the initial 
policy action will be followed by a further I percentage point increment in the second 
year, after which policy will remain stable. Consequently, while the current I-year 
rate increases from 8% to 9%, the three I-year forward rates all rise to 10%. It is clear 
that the medium- and long-tenn spectrums of the yield curve rise by more than the 
increase in short-term rates (the policy rate and the current I-year rate) resulting in a 
steepening yield curve. For clarity, the 2-year bond, at a yield of 9.5%, equals the 
average of the current I-year rate (9%) and I-year rate in one year's time (10%). The 
3-year bond at 9.67% (rounded to two decimal places) equals the average of the 
current I-year rate (9%), the I-year rate in one year' s time (10%) and the I-year rate 
in two years' time (10%). The 4-year long-term bond yielding 9.75% equates to the 
average of the current I-year rate (9%), the I-year rate in one year's time (10%), the 
I-year rate in two years' time (10%) and the I-year rate in three years' time (J 0%). 
Scenario 4 reflects investors' belief that the I percentage point increase in the policy 
rate will only be transitory, and the initial rate hike will be fully reversed in year two. 
In this instance, while the current I-year rate rises to 9%, induced by the I percentage 
point rise in the policy rate, the three I-year forward rates remain at 8%. From Figure 
4.1 it is evident that the medium-and long-term rates follow a declining profile as 
maturity lengthens (negative slope), and that these yields rise less than the initial 
policy action. Evident also is that the elevation in the medium- and long-term rates 
stem entirely from the increase in the policy rate. 
The fifth scenario incorporates a I percentage point rise in the policy rate with a 
corresponding increment in the current I-year rate. Again, investors expect this to be 
transitory, but further believe that, subsequently, policy will be expressly relaxed: it is 
assumed that following the I percentage point increase in the current I-year rate, the 
one-, two- and three-year I-year forward rates price at 8%, 7% and 6%, respectively. 
The implication, manifest in Figure 4.1 , is that while the current I-year rate rises by 
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the full quantum of the policy action, the long-term rate in fact declines and the yield 
curve is strongly inverted. 
4.3.1 Policy considerations 
The role that expectations of future policy actions play in shaping long-term interest 
rates is clear from the scenarios in Figure 4.1; the following inferences can be drawn: 
1. Investors' outlook on the future course of monetary policy influences the 
direction of long-term rates. Noticeably, the popular response of short- and 
long-term rates, particularly when policy action is considered persistent 
(scenarios 2 and 3) or even temporary (scenario 4), is positive in relation to the 
policy action. However, the negative response by long-term rates to an initial 
policy action (scenario 5) is also plausible. 
2. The quantum of variability in long-term rates is related to expectations of 
policy persistence. Scenarios 2 (policy permanence) and 3 (several rate hikes) 
show how long-term rates rise by a similar or greater magnitude to the initial 
policy action. Scenario 4 (temporary rate action), however, reveals a more 
gentle response by long-term rates relative to the rise in the current I-year rate. 
3. The mixture of scenarios in Figure 4.1 show that the variability of long-term 
rates to changes in policy can be noticeably larger than the response of short-
term securities. Expectations about the course of future policy influences 
short-term rates little, while its impact grows along with maturity. In the 
illustration, the 2-year rate rises by between 50 basis points (Scenario 4) and 
ISO basis points (Scenario 3), while the 4-year rate trades between a decline of 
50 basis points and an increase of 175 basis points. 
Given this wide berth in the response of long-term rates to policy actions, it bears 
strongly on the conduct of monetary policy. Moreover, should this variability be 
systematic and associated with the business cycle, the effectiveness of policy In 
influencing long-term rates will be subject to the vagaries of the business cycle. 
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For instance, the response of the medium- and long-term rates in scenario 3 may 
reflect the early stages of a business cycle upswing that is expected to foster sharply 
accelerating inflation and/or inflation expectations. As a result, investors expect the 
authorities will act resolutely to curb economic performance and so restrain inflation. 
The implication is that policy actions may be particularly effective in impacting on 
long-term rates early in the business cycle given investors' expectations of policy 
persistence. 
Alternatively, at a more advanced stage of the business cycle market, participants may 
anticipate listless economic performance and a topping-out of inflation. Investors 
may, therefore, expect only temporary policy tightening and even policy easing 
following the reversal of the initial rate hikes. In this instance, short-term rates will 
fully reflect the temporary policy tightening while long-term rates will respond 
mutely, or even decline. 
While the vagaries of the business cycle are highlighted as influencing monetary 
policy, there are other factors that can weigh on policy decisions. For example, long-
term nominal rates may be shaped by real interest rates, which in turn may be 
influenced by fiscal policy, changes in investment and savings, and financial market 
deregulation. However, these and the influence on the business cycle fall beyond this 
study'S scope. 14 
4.4 CONCLUSION 
The literature survey highlights the waning influence of policy changes on market 
interest rates of longer maturity, i.e. rates further out along the yield curve. However, 
many studies estimated the response of market rates to policy actions only on the days 
surrounding the event. More recent research, however, places emphasis on the 
anticipatory response of the market to policy changes, and shows that the trend 
towards increased monetary policy transparency has enhanced the market's ability to 
predict policy actions. 
14 For insight into the determinants of real interest rates in South Africa, see Khan and Farrell (2002). 
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Further, it emerges from examination of the expectations theory of monetary policy 
that the potential variabil ity in interest rates (principally long-term rates) in response 
to a policy action can be substantial. 
The expectations theory portends that the direction of long-term rates and magnitude 
of movement is related to investors ' expectations of prospective policy interventions, 
and that the outcome of these expectations may yield variable patterns that can be 
either positive or negative. Insofar as a central bank has the capacity to influence 
market expectations about future policy, it is plausible to suggest that it can shape not 
only short-term rates but also long-term rates in a meaningful way. The Reserve 
Bank' s increased transparency under the inflation-targeting framework implies that 
while long-term rates may show substantial variability, this movement may still 
reflect common mind-set between the Bank's view on future monetary policy and that 
of the interest rate market. 
The following chapter examines the extent to which the repo rate influences market 
interest rates in South Africa. It will be apparent that the expectations hypothesis 
resonates strongly with observed market behaviour, and also the fading influence of 
the policy rate on longer-term interest rates, as noted in the literature. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
MONETARY POLICY ACTIONS AND MARKET 
INTEREST RATES IN SOUTH AFRICA 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
Chapter three highlighted that if monetary policy is to be potent in influencing the 
economy and ultimately inflation, the repo rate must have force in terms of 
influencing market interest rates. Movements in the latter then impact on the economy 
through various channels, referred to as the transmission mechanism of monetary 
policy. 
This study has hinted at the efficacy of changes in the repo rate in influencing short-
term interest rates (section 3.3.1). However, concentrating this analysis only on the 
short end of the interest rate curve would be incomplete. Indeed, the Reserve Bank's 
monetary policy actions should also have a strong influence on longer-term interest 
rates to be truly effective. This chapter evaluates the relationship between the Reserve 
Bank's repo rate and short- and long-term market interest rates. 
5.2 CURRENT SHORT-TERM RATES 
With reference to Figure 5.1 (a duplicate of Figure 3.3), the strength of the 
relationship between the Reserve Bank's repo rate and private banks' prime lending 
and fixed deposit rates is evident, signalling the strong impact of monetary policy on 
short-term rates. 
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Figure 5.1 Nominal interest rates in South Africa, 1980-2004 
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Consequently, and founded on the mechanisms of monetary transmission, if the 
Reserve Bank's desire is to boost or restrain aggregate output in the economy with the 
aim of influencing inflation, and assuming that only short-term rates matter, monetary 
policy is seemingly effective. 
For the sake of completeness, the following schematic (a reproduction from section 
3.3.1) illustrates the interest rate charU1el of monetary transmission: 
(5.1) 
M ..l- signals contractionary monetary policy that encourages higher real interest rates 
(i t). The ensuing increase in the cost of capital weighs on investment spending (1 ..l-), 
which leads to a decline in aggregate demand and production (Y ..l-). Finally, inflation 
is affected through changes in the output gap. This example may also be extended to 
household spending, with consistent conclusions. 
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5.3 EXTENDED SHORT-TERM (MONEY MARKET) RATES 15 
Testing for the efficacy of monetary policy on mildly extended short-term rates, such 
as the 3-month JIBAR rate, also shows a firm and positive relationship (see Figure 
5.2). Further, there is a tendency for the JIBAR rate to move slightly in anticipation of 
changes in the repo rate. 
Figure 5.2 Reserve Bank's repo rate and 3-month JIBAR interest rate, 2000-
2004 
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Somewhat longer short-term interest rates, for instance the rates on 6- and l2-month 
negotiable certificates of deposit (NCO), show similar directional trends to the 3-
" The 3-month JIBAR and 6- and 12-month NCD interest rates are used in this analysis because they 
are the most liquid debt instruments covering the sh0l1-term interest rate horizon. Also, market 
participants regard them as benchmarks. 
The Johannesburg Interbank Agreed Rate "JIBAR" is a daily updated money market rate. Various local 
and international banks (curtently 14) are polled daily at about IOh30 for a middle rate (the mid-point 
between their buy and sell rates) on their three-month deposit bankers' acceptances (quoted as a yield). 
The two highest and lowest rates are eliminated from the basket, and the balance of quotes are 
averaged and rounded to three decimal places. The result is quoted as the three-month JIBAR and is 
published daily at II hOO. A bankers' acceptance is a bill of exchange drawn on and accepted by a bank 
(Bond Exchange of South Africa). 
A negotiable certificate of deposit (NCD) is a fixed deposit receipt issued by a bank that is negotiable 
in the secondary market as a financial asset. The issuer undertakes to pay the amount of the deposit 
plus the interest to the holder of the certificate on maturity date. 
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month JIBAR and repo rates (see Figure 5.3). However, it is visually apparent that the 
longer the instrument's maturity, the larger its movement around the repo rate; the 12-
month NCD rate is noticeably more volatile than the 3-month JIBAR rate around the 
repo rate. 
Figure 5.3 Reserve Bank's repo rate, 3-month JIBAR rate, and 6- and 12-month 
NeD rates, 2000-2004 
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5.4 LONG-TERM (BOND) RATES 
In appraising the relationship between long-term debt instruments and the repo rate, 
the association appears weak. For instance, the R157 government bond, which 
matures in September 2015, has a markedly weaker relationship than the 3-month 
HBAR rate has with the repo rate (see Figure 5.4). 
Conspicuously, the yield on the Rl57 bond rose particularly fast between December 
2001 and April 2002, and quicker than both the repo and 3-month JIBAR rates. In this 
instance, the impulse for the movement in these rates stemmed from the sharp and 
broad-based depreciation in the external value of the rand, which raised inflation 
fears. Consequently, market participants began to price in the likelihood of a 
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monetary policy response. It should be noted that this is merely one illustration of 
market reaction to change in an inflation-determining variable. The variability in 
market interest rates, short- and long-term, is derived from numerous other sources, 
too. 
Figure 5.4 Reserve Bank's repo rate, 3-month JIBAR rate, R157 long-term 
government bond yield and USD/ZAR exchange rate, 2000-2004 
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Nonetheless, note that the general decline in the RI57 bond yield from late April 2002 
coincided with further tightening of monetary policy by the Reserve Bank. Indeed, the ' 
R157 bond yield fell by a full 400 basis points before the Reserve Bank implemented 
its first rate cut (100 basis points) in the cycle; the reduction was signalled to the 
market on 12 June 2003. The Reserve Bank then went on to lower its repo rate by a 
further 450 basis points over four months, with relatively mute impact on the R 157 
bond yield. 
Further, the general directional trend of the R157 bond yield is mirrored by a variety 
of other bond instruments of varying maturity - short- and long-term government 
bonds. Figure 5.5 shows the R150 (matured February 2004), R194 (matures in 
February 2008), RI53 (matures in August 2010) and RI86 (matures.in December 
2026) bond yields, in addition to the R157 bond yield. The common tendency is 
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evident, even though there is some divergence in the extent of movement in the 
respective bonds ' yields relative to each other. Of course, the latter translates into 
changes in the shape of the yield curve. 
Figure 5.5 Reserve Bank's repo rate and South African government bond yields 
of varying maturity, 2000-2004 
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5.5 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
To more deeply understand the connection between monetary policy changes and 
market interest rates of varying maturities, an empirical examination of the 
contemporaneous and causal relationships between the repo rate and an assortment of 
short- and long-term rates is undertaken. Daily data for the period January 2000 to 
August 2004 is used throughout this study. 
In Table 5.1 , column I (row 1) captures the contemporaneous relationships between 
the repo rate and market rates as measured by their correlations. The maturity of the 
instruments increases from top (left) to bottom (right). It is evident that the repo rate 
has a strong association with short-term rates but a comparatively weaker relationship 
with instruments of longer maturity. For instance, the repo rate has a 98% correlation 
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with the 3-month JIBAR rate and a mere 9% correlation with the long-term RI86 
government bond. 
Table 5.1 Correlation matrix 
JIBAR NCD NCD 
REPO 3M 6M 12M RlSO R194 RIS3 RIS7 RI86 
REPO 100% 98% 95% 87% 65% 41 % 33% 19% 9% 
JIBAR3M 98% 100% 97% 92% 70% 45% 37% 22% 11 % 
NCD6M 95% 97% 100% 95% 76% 53% 46% 31% 20% 
NCD 12M 87% 92% 95% 100% 88% 7 1% 65% 50% 37% 
RISO 65% 70% 76% 88% 100% 94% 91% 83% 74% 
R194 41% 45% 53% 71 % 94% 100% 99% 95% 88% 
R153 33% 37% 46% 65% 91% 99% 100% 98% 92% 
R157 19% 22% 31% 50% 83% 95% 98% 100% 97% 
R186 9% 11 % 20% 37% 74% 88% 92% 97% 100% 
There is general consistency between the findings of Granger causality tests and the 
correlation results, as the repo rate appears to have stronger causal relationships with 
instruments of short maturity than with long-tenn rates. Table 5.2 shows that the repo 
rate Granger causes most of the short-tenn rates (the 3- and 6-month rates, although 
not the 12-month rate) and the RI50 government bond that matured in February 2004. 
Although the R 150 was a bond and not a money market instrument, its result is 
altogether unsurprising given the closeness of its maturity relative to the sample 
period and also the gap between its expiry date compared with the longer-dated bonds 
in the sample. Also, market participants increasingly regarded the R 150 bond as a 
money market instrument for several quarters before it matured, often trading it in a 
manner similar to other short-tenn instruments. 
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Table 5.2 Granger causality tests 
Null Hypothesis: F -Statistic P-Value Result 16 
Repo does not Granger Cause 3m JIBAR 2.00 0.01 Reject Ho 
Repo does not Granger Cause 6m NCO 1.79 0.04 Reject Ho 
Repo does not Granger Cause 12m NCO 0.80 0.67 Do not reject Ho 
Repo does not Granger Cause RI50 1.65 0.06 Reject Ho 
Repo does not Granger Cause R 194 1.07 0.38 Do not reject Ho 
Repo does not Granger Cause R 153 1.13 0.32 Do not rej ect Ho 
Repo does not Granger Cause R186 0.68 0.80 Do not reject Ho 
Repo does not Granger Cause R15 7 0.84 0.63 Do not rej ect Ho 
5.6 CONCLUSION 
It is plain, both visually and empirically, that the relationship between the repo rate 
and other interest rates becomes weaker as the maturity of the debt instrument 
lengthens. On occasion, long-term rates even decline when the repo rate rises and 
monetary policy is tightened. This evidence concurs with that gleaned from the 
literature review and also the tenets of the expectations theory of monetary policy. 
The next chapter quantifies the impact of repo rate changes on various short-and 
long-term interest rates in South Africa. Also, the chapter tests whether market 
participants anticipate policy actions as would be expected with heightened policy 
transparency. 
16 At a 10% level of significance. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
QUANTIFYING THE IMPACT OF MONETARY POLICY 
ON INTEREST RATES IN SOUTH AFRICA 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
This study has shown that expectations of future monetary policy actions go some 
way towards explaining the variability in interest rates, particularly longer-term 
instruments. Further, it is possible for the market's response to a particular monetary 
policy action to be either mute or acute. 
Amled with this understanding, this chapter estimates the effect of monetary policy 
on interest rates in South Africa. However, the methodology goes beyond merely 
gauging the market rates' response to policy changes in the days surrounding the 
event. Instead, the model centres on the anticipatory nature of the market with 
reference to policy actions. 
6.2 THE MEASUREMENT PERIOD 
It will be clear from earlier discussion (see section 4.3) that the shape of the yield 
curve is strongly influenced by investors' expectations of future short-term rates. 
Consequently, if investors anticipate the Reserve Bank' s current action and do not 
alter their views on the future, long-term rates should respond mutely, if at all. If, 
however, the Reserve Bank' s current action is unexpected, long-term rates may 
respond acutely, and the magnitude of the reaction may further be amplified if 
investors alter their view to reflect additional future policy action. 
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Notably, though, the period over which the response of long-term interest rates to 
policy changes is measured is essential in fully capturing its impact. For instance, 
long-term interest rates may respond mutely in the immediate aftermath of an 
anticipated policy action, even though there may have been a marked change in the 
long-term rate prior to the event and in expectation of the change. Consequently, only 
evaluating the immediate impact reflects a partial analysis and, therefore, the 
measurement period needs to be of sufficient length to fully capture the anticipated 
effects. 
Roley and Sellon (1995: 82) highlight how most studies focused on the immediate 
movement of long-tenn rates in the days surrounding the policy action. However, 
what is evident from Figure 5.4 is that following the sharp depreciation of the rand in 
the final quarter of 2001 and prior to the Reserve Bank' s policy intervention on 15 
January, longer term rates, in this example the R157 govenunent bond yield, rose 
substantially in the period late-November 200 I through January 2002. It is clear, even 
from mere casual observation, that only assessing the impact of the movement in the 
R157 on the day of the policy action and the days surrounding the event does not fully 
capture the market's response to the change in policy. 
Nonetheless, while accepting that a longer measurement period is appropriate, 
identifying a correct and consistent measurement period is equally tricky. The method 
employed in this study follows Roley and Sellon' s (1995: 81-85) analysis of the US 
Treasury market. 
6.3 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
As a precursor to a more disaggregated analysis, the study separates movement in 
long-term interest rates into two intervals in an attempt to gauge the extent of 
anticipatOlY interest rate movement (the period starting on the day after the last 
change in the repo rate to the day before the current change) and the immediate 
response surrounding the policy action (the period covering the day of the current 
repo rate action and the day after). 
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The sample period starts when the Reserve Bank adopted inflation targeting in 2000, 
and ends after the Bank's most recent repo rate change in August 2004. The change to 
an inflation targeting system represented a structural break from the previous 
"eclectic" framework pursued during the late 1990s and the specific focus on M3 
money supply before that (see chapter two). Specifically, though, the nature of the 
inflation targeting system expressly promotes increased transparency by the 
authorities and, as highlighted in the literature review, can alter the response of 
market interest rates to policy changes relative to opaque monetary policy 
frameworks. 
6.3.1 Two-phase measurement period 
The full sample period captures 14 events out of 30 MPC meetings where the repo 
rate was altered to influence market interest rates. The 100 basis points technical 
adjustment on 6 September 2001 is excluded from this analysis because it was not 
designed to impact market rates but is merely an attempt by the Reserve Bank to 
make the repo system more effective (see section 3.2.1). 
Figure 6.1 captures movements in the R157 bond yield over the period January 2000 
to August 2004, measured over two different intervals: 
1. the immediate interval represents changes in the R157 bond yield on the day 
of and the day after the repo rate change. In other words, the change in the 
bond's yield from the close on the day preceding the repo rate change to the 
close on the day after the change; and 
2. the total response to a repo rate change is captured by the change in the R 157 
bond yield from the close on the day following the last policy change to the 
close on the day following the current action. 
In almost every instance the immediate response is noticeably shallower compared 
with the total response, indicating that the change in long-term rates is largely 
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anticipatory - most of the change occurs between the date of the last policy change 
and the day prior to the current change. 
Figure 6.1 Impact of policy actions on the long-term R157 government bond rate 
- normalised, 2000-2004 
3 
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Source: South African Reserve Bank, QlIarterly Bulletin December 2004. pg S-28; Bloomberg 
Terminal; author 's calculations 
This exercise is repeated for the R 186 bond (Figure 6.2). The results concur, in that 
there is markedly greater movement in the RI86 bond yield in a build-up to the policy 
event than on the day of and the day following the policy action. 
It is noted that the quantum of change in the Reserve Bank's policy rate was not 
always consistent over the sample period. For instance, the Bank sometimes altered its 
policy rate by 25 basis points (twice), 50 basis points (three occasions), 100 basis 
points (seven times) and ISO basis points (twice). Consequently, the change in the 
yields of the R 157 and R 186 bonds, over both the narrow and wide intervals, is 
divided by the change in the Reserve Bank's repo rate. This normalised result implies 
that if the R 157 bond yield in the graph rose by 1 unit, the increase perfectly matched 
the rise in the repo rate. Similarly, if the R157 bond yield rose by 2 units (on the 
graph) it means that the increase was twice as large as the Reserve Bank' s repo rate 
action. Note, however, that the direction of movement in the R157 bond yield remains 
unaltered when normalising. So, it is possible for the respective bond yields to move 
by the same quantum as the Reserve Bank's action, but in the opposite direction. 
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Figure 6.2 Impact of policy actions on the long-term R186 government bond rate 
- normalised, 2000-2004 
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Source: South African Reserve Bank, Quarterly Bulletin December 2004, pg S-28; Bloomberg 
Terminal; author's calculations 
6.3.2 Econometric analysis 
While it is graphically evident (Figures 6, I and 6,2) that on almost all occasions the 
bulk of movement in long-term interest rates occurs prior to the policy action, 
additional insight is to be gleaned through further decomposition of the reactions, In 
this regard, regression models are employed in the analysis, following the method 
used by Roley and Sellon (1995: 87) in their assessment of the US Treasury market. 
The model is specified as follows: 
(6.\) 
where ai is the estimated constant in regression i, Pi is the estimated coefficient in 
regression i, and ei is the random error term in equation i. The independent variable 
t:..rff, / represents the change in the Reserve Bank's repo rate and the dependent 
variables are: 
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f).RI,1 = change in the market interest rate from the day following the last 
change in the repo rate at time t -I to the day preceding the current repo rate 
change at time t. The closing rate on each relevant day is applied. This phase 
will be referred to as "before" in the text. 
f).R2,1 = change in the closing market interest rate on the day preceding the 
current repo rate change at time t to the close on day t. This phase will be 
referred to as "on" in the text. 
f).R3,1 = change in the market interest rate from the day of the current repo rate 
change at time t to the close on the following day. This phase will be referred 
to as "after" in the text. 
= change in the closing market interest rate from the day following the last 
repo rate change at time t-I to the close on the day subsequent to the current 
change at time t. This phase will be referred to as "tolar' in the text. 
Table 6.1 presents the regressIOn results summarlslllg the relationship between 
changes in the repo rate and the response of the RI57 bond. Admittedly, these 
regressIOns are based on a relatively small sample as the structural changes in 
monetary policy in South Africa prevent the use of a longer sample period. Still, the 
result of the relevant diagnostic tests (Table 6.2) shows that none of the standard 
regression assumptions have been violated, and from this perspective the results are, 
therefore, valid. Nevertheless, due to the limited degrees of freedom, the confidence 
intervals are relatively wide and caution should be exercised when interpreting and 
employing the results, especially where the magnitudes of the coefficients are used. 
However, despite the large standard errors, the results should be sufficiently robust for 
the purposes of this study, since the key results of interest are consistent across 
different interest rates. Ideally, this exercise should be repeated as more observations 
become available. 
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Table 6.1 Analysis of the relationship between the Reserve Bank's repo rate and 
the R1S7 government bond yield: Regression results 
Before On After Total 
-j} 
I - 2 3 4 
Constant (a;) -0.216 -0.042 0.055 -0.204 
standard error 0.225 0.025 0.056 0.278 
I-stalistic -0.958 -1.663 0.971 -0.735 
Coefficient of 0.412** 0.023 0,058 0.494* 
repo rale (/J;) 
Standard error 0.211 0.020 0.053 0.296 
t-statistic 1.954 1.155 1.086 1.669 
R' 17% 4% 11% 19% 
Adjusted R' 10% -4% 5% 12% 
•• significant al a 5% level. 
• significant at a 10% level. 
17 The notation is explained in equation 6.1. 
.', 
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Table 6.2 Diagnostic tests of the R157 government bond yield regressions 
Regression Test Statistic Conclusion 18 
Before Durbin-Watson 1.885 No serial correlation of order I 
Breusch-Godrrey (2) 0.047 No serial correlation of order 2 
Breusch-Godrrey (3) 0.577 No serial correlation of order 3 
ARCH (I) 0.758 No ARCH-type heteroscedasticity of order I 
ARCH (2) 3.000 No ARCH-type heteroscedasticity of order 2 
ARCH (3) 4.776 No ARCH-type heteroscedasticity of order 3 
White 1.1 28 No heteroscedasticity 
On Durbin-Watson 2.711" Results are inconclusive regarding the presence 
of first-order serial correlation 
Breusch-Godrrey (2) 1.312 No serial correlation of order 2 
Breusch-Godrrey (3) 4.029 No serial correlation of order 3 
ARCH (I) 0.200 No ARCH-type heteroscedasticity of order I 
ARCH (2) 0.855 No ARCH-type heteroscedasticity of order 2 
ARCH (3) 3.843 No ARCH-type heteroscedasticity of order 3 
White 3.869 No heteroscedasticity 
After Durbin-Watson 1.24 Results are inconclusive regarding the presence 
of first-order serial correlation2O 
Breusch-Godrrey (2) 0.874 No serial correlation of order 2 
Breusch-Godfrey (3) 3.078 No serial correlation of order 3 
ARCH (I) 0.111 No ARCH-type heteroscedasticity of order I 
ARCH (2) 0.385 No ARCH-type heteroscedasticity of order 2 
ARCH (3) 0.607 No ARCH-type heteroscedasticity of order 3 
White 2.039 No heteroscedasticity 
Total Durbin-Watson 1.92 No serial correlation of order I 
Breusch-Godrrey (2) 0.002 No serial correlation of order 2 
Breusch-Godrrey (3) 1.108 No serial correlation of order 3 
ARCH (I) 1.202 No ARCH-type heteroscedasticity of order I 
ARCH (2) 2.250 No ARCH-type heteroscedasticity of order 2 
18 At a 5% level of significance. 
" The test statistic fell in the inconclusive range of critical values for the Durbin-Watson test. 
However, the Breusch-Godrrey test (test statistic 0.894) does not reject the null hypothesis of no first-
order serial correlation. 
20 The test statistic fell in the inconclusive range of critical values for the Durbin-Watson test. 
However, the Breusch-Godrrey test (test statistic 0.338) does not reject the null hypothesis of no first-
order serial correlation. 
ARCH (3) 
White 
4.370 
0.869 
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No ARCH-type heteroscedasticity of order 3 
No heteroscedasticity 
These econometric results confirm the earlier hypothesis (see section 6.3.1) that most 
of the impact of changes in monetary policy occurs before rather than on or after the 
actual change in the repo rate. The coefficient of the change in repo rate is not only 
bigger in the before model (0.412) than in the on or after models (0.023 and 0.058, 
respectively), but is only statistically significant in the former and not the latter 
models. It is also significant at a 10% level in the total model. 
The results imply that for a one percentage point change in the repo rate, the RI57 
bond yield will change by 0.412 percentage points before the actual announcement of 
the current repo rate change (but after the previous repo change). The RI57 bond 
yield will change by only 0.023 percentage points and 0.058 percentage points on the 
day of and the day after a one percentage point change in the repo rate, respectively 
(although these changes are statistically insignificant). In total, the yield on the RI57 
bond yield changes by almost 0.5 percentage points when the repo rate changes by 
one percentage point. 
For the conclusions reached above to be meaningful, it is crucial to verify that they 
are not specific to the RI57 bond yield, but valid across different interest rates. The 
exercise is therefore repeated for several other instruments (see Table 6.3), with 
similar results to those for the RI57 bond. 
In the case of the R 153 bond, for example, most of the impact of changes in monetary 
policy is again felt before rather than on or after the actual change in the repo rate. 
The coefficient of the change in repo is again bigger in the "before" model (0.537) 
than in the on or after models (0.091 and 0.004, respectively), and is only statistically 
significant in the former and not the latter models 21 The repo rate is also statistically 
significant in the total model. 
21 At a 5% level of significance, the coefficient of the repo rate is significant only in the before model. 
However, at a 10% level of significance, it is also significant in the on model. 
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Table 6.3 Analysis of the relationship between the Reserve Bank's repo rate and 
market interest rates: Regression results22 
Interest rate Before On After Total 
IlJ _ 2 3 4 
3-month JIBAR Pi 0.524** 0.023** 0.372** 0.919** 
(t-statistic) 4.140 2.658 4.280 11.65 
6-month NCD Pi 0.623** -0.055 0.266** 0.833** 
(t -statistic) 3.773 -1.030 2.5 17 5.118 
12-month NCD Pi 0.83 1 ** 0.126 0.203'* 1.107*' 
(t-statistic) 4.067 0.547 2.927 4.904 
R ISO" Pi 0.560** 0.1 28' 0.031' 0.720** 
(t-statistic) 3.119 1.511 1.455 3.320 
RI53 Pi 0.537** 0.091* 0.004 0.632*' 
(t-statistic) 1.960 1.656 0.156 2.086 
RI57 Pi 0.412*' 0.023 0.058 0.494' 
(t-statistic) 1.952 1.150 1.086 1.669 
RI86 Pi 0.235 0.1 95** 0.012 0.442* 
(t-stat istic) 0.937 1.996 0.284 1.544 
** significant at a 5% level. 
* significant at a 10% level. 
The following general trends emerge from the results in Table 6.3: 
• For all the market interest rates, the coefficient of the repo rate is bigger in the 
before equation than in the on or after equations. This supports the earlier 
hypothesis that most of the reaction in interest rates due to a change in the 
22 More detailed regression results as well as the diagnostic tests of the models are presented in 
Appendix A. 
23 Following the notation in equation 6.1. 
24 Since the R ISO matured in February 2004, the sample of the models involving this yield is slightly 
different from the others since the last policy event (in August 2004) is excluded. However, due to the 
prominence of this instrument during most of the sample period, it is included in the analysis. 
~ '. 
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repo rate occurs before the change in the monetary policy stance rather than on 
the day of the change or the day after. 
• The coefficient of the repo rate is significant in all the lolal equations, which 
means that the repo rate impacts significantly on interest rates across the 
spectrum of maturities. 
• The coefficient of the repo rate is also significant in all of the "before" 
equations (except the R186 bond). This means that changes in the repo rate are 
mostly anticipated by the market, and that interest rates across the spectrum of 
maturities change significantly in anticipation of a change in the monetary 
policy stance. 
• From a market trader perspective, it is noteworthy that the repo rate is not 
statistically significant in any of the after equations of the long-term interest 
rates (except that of the R150 bond). In other words, bond yields react either 
before or on the day of a change in the repo rate, but not after. Moreover, the 
extent of the change is noticeably larger before the policy event compared 
with the change that occurs on or after the event, suggesting that substantially 
more leverage is to be had in positioning in advance of the event. This applies 
to all the instruments quoted except the R186 bond. This bond exhibits more 
or less the same coefficient before (0.235) and on (0.195) the day of the repo 
rate change. However, some circumspection is necessary given that the before 
result is statistically insignificant25 
25 While it cannot be expected that all long-term bonds behave similarly in response to repo rate 
changes, the RI86 bond appears to exhibit unusual movement relative to both the RI53 and RI57 
bonds. This may relate to the relative illiquidity of the R 186 bond. It is widely believed that financial 
institutions with long-term liability streams pursue a fervent "buy and hold" strategy in the RI86 bond 
due to the low supply of issuance by the government relative to demand. The RI86 bond turned over 
10.3% of its nominal outstanding issue amount in 2003 compared with 33.5% for the RI53 bond and 
19.9% for the RI57 instrument. In 2002, the RI86 bond's turnover ratio was 17.6%, while that of the 
RI53 bond was 30.6% and the RI57 bond was 25% (National Treasury, 2004: 101). Of course, thc 
difference in movement in the various bond yields may also have some resonance with, among others, 
factors such as the term premia and the varying influence of the business cycle on bond yields of 
different maturity. 
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• Except in the case of the l2-month NeD, the coefficient of the repo rate 
declines in the total column as the time to maturity increases. Therefore, the 
impact of the repo rate on other rates seems to decline out the yield curve, 
which supports the conclusions reached in chapter five. 
• Insofar as most of the impact of the change in monetary policy is in 
anticipation of the policy event, this broadly concurs with the results of Roley 
and Sellon (\ 995: 84) in their study of the US Treasury market (noted in 
section 4.2). For instance, their results show that the 30-year Treasury bond 
yield will change by 0.2793 percentage points before an actual one percentage 
point change in the Federal funds rate target, 0.0437 percentage points on the 
day of the policy change and 0.0570 percentage points the day after. The total 
change amounts to 0.3799 percentage points26 
6.4 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has estimated the impact on various market interest rates stemming from 
a change in monetary policy through the repo rate. It is evident that changes in the 
repo rate have a significant impact on market interest rates of all maturities, although 
generally with fading impact as the maturity ofthe instrument increases. 
Further, there is strong evidence that the movement in market rates is mostly in 
anticipation of the policy event, with comparatively modest movement on the day of 
or the day after a change in the repo rate. 
It would be expected that with the shift to inflation targeting and particularly the 
increased policy transparency that this framework engenders, market participants 
should be better able to anticipate policy changes correctly. The evidence presented in 
this chapter is that the movement in market interest rates is indeed anticipatory, since 
most of the changes in the interest rates occur before the actual change in the repo 
rate. In contrast, if there was a large movement in interest rates on the day of or the 
26 The before result is significant at a 10% level while the after and /0/0/ results are significant at a 5% 
level. The result on the day of the policy change in not significant. 
I 
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day after a policy change, it would signal that the monetary authorities and market 
participants were too often not in sync. Clearly, this is not the case. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
This study has assessed the effectiveness of the Reserve Bank's monetary policy 
within the inflation-targeting framework that has been in employ since 2000. 
Specifically, the accent of the study has been on whether the shift towards increased 
policy transparency, which is an intrinsic feature of the Bank' s inflation-targeting 
system, has enhanced both the anticipatory nature of the market's response to policy 
actions and the force that policy has on all interest rates in the financial system, 
particularly long-term rates. 
These concepts are important because the more deft market participants are at 
anticipating future Reserve Bank policy, the greater the Bank's ability to steady the 
economy in advance of the actual policy event. 
7.2 THE STUDY 
The literature on the impact of monetary policy on market interest rates, which is 
largely of an international hue, shows that a shift towards enhanced policy 
transparency increases the anticipatory response of market rates to policy changes. 
Also, the literature shows that policy has waning influence on market rates of longer 
maturity, even though this may still be significant. 
In South Africa, monetary policy has evolved substantially over the last two decades 
with specific emphasis on the shift to heightened transparency and accountability by 
the Reserve Bank under the inflation-targeting framework. Within this paradigm, this 
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study shows most of the movement in market rates occurs in anticipation of policy 
action, rather than on the day of the event or the day after. For example, the yield 
R157 long-term government bond changes by a significant 41 basis points in response 
to a one percentage point change in the Reserve Bank's benchmark repo rate in the 
period between the last policy action and the day preceding the current action. In 
contrast, the R157 bond yield changes by an insignificant 2 basis points on the day of 
the current repo rate change and about 1 basis point the day after the current change. 
The results point to a robust relationship between policy transparency and the 
market' s ability to foresee rate action. Indeed, if this were not the case it is likely that 
there would be a persistence of market surprise and, hence, noticeable movement in 
interest rates on the day of the rate action and perhaps even the day after. 
Another important observation is that changes in the Reserve Bank's monetary policy 
impact significantly on both short- and long-term market rates, albeit with 
diminishing weight further out the yield curve. Again, this certifies the robustness of 
domestic monetary policy. 
7.3 CONCLUSION 
The contribution of this study is in its appraisal of the effectiveness of monetary 
policy. Van der Merwe (2004: 12) writes: "the question may be asked how effective 
the implementation of inflation-targeting has been in South Africa. Unfortunately, 
there is only a relatively short period over which the performance of inflation-
targeting can be evaluated." 
This study accedes that the limited sample used in the analysis justifies some 
circumspection in the interpretation and application of its results. However, on 
balance, it appears that the Reserve Bank's performance in articulating monetary 
policy within the inflation-targeting framework is commendable. This is certified to 
the extent that the preponderance of market surprise to monetary policy events, as 
would be evident in large movements on the day of the policy change or the day after, 
is rare. 
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In addition, while the impact of monetary policy diminishes further out the yield 
curve, the impact of policy is significant. This implies a healthy understanding by the 
market of the Reserve Bank's objectives and the specifications of the inflation-
targeting framework. 
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APPENDIX A 
Table A.1 Analysis of the relationship between the 3·month JIBAR rate and the 
Reserve Bank's repo rate: Regression results 
Before On After Tota l 
·27 I - 2 3 4 
Constant (a,) 0.016 -0.012 -0.055 -0.050 
standard error 0.119 0.008 0.082 0.074 
t-statistic 0.138 -1.462 -0.668 -0.677 
Coefficient of 0.524** 0.023** 0.372** 0.919** 
repo rate (P,) 
Standard error 0.126 0.009 0.087 0.079 
t-statistic 4.140 2.658 4.280 11.652 
R' 0.588 0.371 0.604 0.919 
Adjusted R' 0.554 0.318 0.571 0.912 
** significant at a 50/0 level. 
• significant at a 10% level. 
27 For the explanation of the notation, see equation 6.1. 
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Table A.2 Analysis of the relationship between the 6-month NCD rate and the 
Reserve Bank's repo rate: Regression results 
Before On After Total 
·28 I - 2 3 4 
Constant (n;) 0.015 -0.078 0.040 -0.024 
standard error 0.155 0.050 0.099 0.153 
t-statistic 0.095 -1.553 0.402 -0.155 
Coefficient of 0.623** -0.055 0.266*' 0.834** 
repo rate (P;) 
Standard error 0.165 0.054 0.106 0.163 
t-statistic 3.773 -1.030 2.517 5. 118 
R' 0.543 0.081 0.345 0.686 
Adjusted R' 0.504 0.005 0.291 0.660 
** significant at a 50/0 level. 
* significant at a 100/0 level. 
Table A.3 Analysis of the relationship between the 12-month NCD rate and the 
Reserve Bank's repo rate: Regression results 
Before On 
·29 I - 2 
Constant (n;) -0.003 -0.133 
standard error 0.192 0.217 
t-statistic -0.015 -0.612 
Coefficient of 0.831*' 0.126 
repo rate (P;) 
Standard error 0.204 0.231 
t-statistic 4.067 0.547 
R' 0.579 0.024 
Adjusted R' 0.544 -0.057 
** significant at a 50/0 level. 
• s ignificant at a 10% level. 
28 For the explanation of the notation, see equation 6. 1. 
29 For the explanation of the notation, see equation 6. 1. 
After Total 
3 4 
-0.008 0.019 
0.065 0.212 
-0 .124 0.092 
0.203** 1.107** 
0.069 0.226 
2.927 4.904 
0.416 0.667 
0.368 0.639 
69 
Table A.4 Analysis of the relationship between the R153 government bond yield 
and the Reserve Bank's repo rate: Regression results 
Before On After Total 
' 3U I - 2 3 4 
Constant (<1i) -0.241 0.019 0.013 -0.208 
standard error 0.258 0.052 0.022 0.285 
t-statistic -0.933 0.367 0.612 -0.732 
Coefficient of 0.537** 0.091* 0.004 0.632** 
repo rate (Pi) 
Standard error 0.274 0.0559 0.023 0.303 
t-statist ic 1.960 1.656 0.156 2.086 
R' 24% 19% 0% 27% 
Adjusted R' 18% 12% -8% 20% 
** significant at a 5% level. 
• significant at a 10% level. 
Table A-S Analysis of the relationship between the R186 government bond yield 
and the Reserve Bank's repo rate: Regression results 
Before On 
·]1 I - 2 
Constant -0.270 0.003 
standard error 0.236 0.092 
t-statistic -1.14 0.037 
Coefficient of 0.235 0.195** 
repo 
standard error 0.25 1 0.098 
t-statistic 0.937 1.996 
R' 7% 25% 
Adjusted R' - 1% 19% 
** significant at a 5% level. 
• significant at a 10% level. 
30 For the explanation of the notation, see equation 6.1. 
31 For the explanation of the notation, see equation 6.1. 
After Tota l 
3 4 
-0.027 -0.294 
0.039 0.269 
-0 .70 -01.093 
0.012 0.442* 
0.041 0.286 
0.284 1.544 
1% 17% 
-8% 10% 
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Table A.6 Granger causality tests 
Null Hypothesis: F-Statistic Probability Result 
3m JlBAR does not Granger Cause repo 4.06 0.00 Reject Ho 
Repo does not Granger Cause 3m JIBAR 2.00 0.01 Reject Ho 
6m NCO does not Granger Cause repo 1.96 0.02 Reject Ho 
Repo does not Granger Cause 6m NCO 1.79 0.04 Reject Ho 
12m NCO does not Granger Cause repo 3. 10 0.00 Rejecll-lo 
Repo does not Granger Cause 12m NCO 0.80 0.67 Do not reject Ho 
R 150 does not Granger Cause repo 2.99 0.00 Reject Ho 
Repo does not Granger Cause R 150 1.65 0.06 Reject Ho 
R 194 does not Granger Cause repo 2.42 0.00 Reject Ho 
Repo does not Granger Cause R 194 1.07 0.38 Do not reject Ho 
R 153 does not Granger Cause repo 2.67 0.00 Reject Ho 
Repo does not Granger Cause RI5 3 l.l3 0.32 Do not reject Ho 
R 186 does not Granger Cause repo l.l7 0.29 Do not reject Ho 
Repo does not Granger Cause R 186 0.68 0.80 Do not reject Ho 
RI57 does not Granger Cause repo l.l3 0.33 Do not reject Ho 
Repo does not Granger Cause RI57 0.84 0.63 Do not reject Ho 
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Table A.7 Diagnostic tests of the 3-month JIBAR interest rate regressions 
Regression Test Statistic Conclusionl2 
Before Durbin-Watson 2.14 No serial correlation of order I 
Breusch-GodJTey (2) 6.851 No serial correlation of order 2 
t-
Breusch-GodJTey (3) 6.938 No serial correlation of order 3 
ARCH (I) 1.822 No ARCH-type heteroscedasticity of order I 
ARCH (2) 5.8 12 No ARCH-type heteroscedasticity of order 2 
ARCH (3) 5.660 No ARCH-type heteroscedasticity of order 3 
White 6.648 No heteroscedasticity 
On Durbin-Watson 1.62 No serial correlation of order I 
Breusch-GodJTey (2) 1.770 No serial correlation of order 2 
Breusch-GodJTey (3) 5.940 No serial correlation of order 3 
ARCH (I) 0.000 No ARCH-type heteroscedasticity of order I 
ARC H (2) 0. 11 9 No ARCH-type heteroscedasticity of order 2 
ARCH (3) 0.257 No ARCH -type heteroscedasticity of order 3 
White 2.994 No heteroscedasticity 
After Durbin-Watson 1.902 No serial correlation of order I 
Breusch-GodJTey (2) 1.134 No serial correlation of order 2 
Breusch-GodJTey (3) 1.673 No serial correlation of order 3 
ARCH ( I) 0.2 19 No ARCH-type heteroscedasticity of order I 
ARCH (2) 0.436 No ARCH-type heteroscedasticity of order 2 
ARCH (3) 0.436 No ARCH-type heteroscedasticity of order 3 
White 2.422 No heteroscedasticity 
Total Durbin-Watson 1.697 No serial correlation of order I 
Breusch-GodJTey (2) 2.694 No serial correlation of order 2 
Breusch-GodJTey (3) 2.759 No serial correlation of order 3 
ARCH ( I) 0.030 No ARCH-type heteroscedasticity of order I 
ARCH (2) 0.416 No ARCH-type heteroscedasticity of order 2 
ARCH (3) 2.759 No ARCH-type heteroscedasticity of order 3 
White 3.855 No heteroscedasticity 
32 At a 1 % level of significance. 
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Table A.S Diagnostic tests of the 6-month NCD interest rate regressions 
Regression Test Statistic ConciusionlJ 
Before Durbin-Watson 2.14 No serial correlation of order I 
Breusch-Godfrey (2) 0.685 No serial correlation of order 2 
Breusch-Godfrey (3) 6.938 No serial correlation of order 3 
ARCH (I) 1.822 No ARCH-type heteroscedasticity of order I 
ARCH (2) 5.812 No ARCH-type heteroscedastic ity of order 2 
ARCH (3) 5.660 No ARCH-type heteroscedastici ty of order 3 
White 0.648 No heteroscedasticity 
On Durbin-Watson 1.62 No serial correlation of order I 
Breusch-Godfrey (2) 1.770 No serial correlation of order 2 
Breusch-Godfrey (3) 5.940 No serial correlation of order 3 
ARCH (I) 0.000 No ARCH-type heteroscedasticity of order I 
ARCH (2) 0.119 No ARCH-type heteroscedasticity of order 2 
ARCH (3) 0.257 No ARCH-type heteroscedasticity of order 3 
White 2.994 No heteroscedasticity 
After Durbin-Watson 1.902 No serial correlation of order I 
Breusch-Godfrey (2) 1.1 34 No serial correlation of order 2 
Breusch-Godfrey (3) 1.673 No serial correlation of order 3 
ARCH (I) 0.219 No ARCH -type heteroscedasticity of order I 
ARCH (2) 0.436 No ARCH-type heteroscedasticity of order 2 I ARC H (3) 0.436 No ARCH-type heteroscedastic ity of order 3 
White 2.422 No heteroscedasticity 
Total Dorbin-Watson 1.697 No serial correlation of order I 
Breusch-Godfrey (2) 2.694 No serial correlation of order 2 
Breusch-Godfrey (3) 2.759 No serial correlation of order 3 
ARCH (I) 0.030 No ARCH-type heteroscedasticity of order I 
ARCH (2) 0.416 No ARCH-type heteroscedasticity of order 2 
ARCH (3) 2.759 No ARCH-type heteroscedasticity of order 3 
White 3.855 No heteroscedasticity 
3l At a I % level of significance. 
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Table A.9 Diagnostic tests of the 12-month NeD interest rate regressions 
Regression Test Statistic ConclusionJ4 
Before Durbin-Watson 1.476 No serial correlation of order I 
Breusch-Godrrey (2) 0.316 No serial correlation of order 2 
Breusch-Godrrey (3) 1.844 No serial correlation of order 3 
ARCH (I) 0.173 No ARCH-type heteroscedasticity of order I 
ARCH (2) 0.113 No ARCH-type heteroscedasticity of order 2 
ARCH (3) 0.436 No ARCH-type heteroscedasticity of order 3 
White 1.630 No heteroscedasticity 
On Durbin-Watson 2.47 No serial correlation of order I 
Breusch-Godrrey (2) 1.041 No serial correlation of order 2 
Breusch-Godfrey (3) 1.077 No serial correlation of order 3 
ARCH (I) 0.023 No ARCH-type heteroscedasticity of order I 
ARCH (2) 0.192 No ARCH-type heteroscedasticity of order 2 
ARCH (3) 0.436 No ARCH-type heteroscedasticity of order 3 
White 1.269 No heteroscedasticity 
After Durbin-Watson 2.32 No serial correlation of order I 
Breusch-Godrrey (2) 0.526 No serial correlation of order 2 
Breusch-Godrrey (3) 0.717 No serial correlation of order 3 
ARCH (I) 2.525 No ARCH-type heteroscedasticity of order I 
ARCH (2) 4.222 No ARCH-type heteroscedasticity of order 2 
ARCH (3) 4.\36 No ARCH-type heteroscedasticity of order 3 
White 1.055 No heteroscedasticity 
Total Durbin-Watson 1.348 No serial correlation of order I 
Breusch-Godrrey (2) 0.184 No serial correlation of order 2 
Breusch-Godrrey (3) 1.901 No serial correlation of order 3 
ARCH (I) 1.086 No ARCH-type heteroscedasticity of order I 
ARCH (2) 1.487 No ARCH-type heteroscedasticity of order 2 
ARCH (3) 2.327 No ARCH-type heteroscedasticity of order 3 
White 1.039 No heteroscedasticity 
34 At a I % level of signi fica nee. 
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Table A.I0 Diagnostic tests of the R153 government bond yield regressions 
Regression Test Statistic Conclusion3! 
Before Durbin-Watson 1.985 No serial correlation of order I 
Breusch-Godfrey (2) 0.153 No serial correlation of order 2 
Breusch-Godfrey (3) 1.000 No serial correlation of order 3 
ARCH (I) 0.313 No ARCH-type heteroscedasticity of order I 
ARCH (2) 1.377 No ARCH-type heteroscedasticity of order 2 
ARCH (3) 1.822 No ARCH-type heteroscedasticity of order 3 
White 2.980 No heteroscedasticity 
On Durbin-Watson 1.743 No serial correlation of order I 
Breusch-Godfrey (2) 1.445 No serial correlation of order 2 
Breusch-Godfrey (3) 4.767 No serial correlation of order 3 
ARCH (I) 0.261 No ARCH-type heteroscedasticity of order I 
ARCH (2) 0.346 No ARCH-type heteroscedasticity of order 2 
ARCH (3) 0.669 No ARCH-type heteroscedasticity of order 3 
White 2.088 No heteroscedasticity 
After Durbin-Watson 1.583 No serial correlation of order I 
Breusch-Godfrey (2) 2.274 No serial correlation of order 2 
Breusch-Godfrey (3) 4.635 No serial correlation of order 3 
ARCH (I) 1.073 No ARCH-type heteroscedasticity of order I 
ARCH (2) 0.867 No ARCH-type heteroscedasticity of order 2 
ARCH (3) 1.284 No ARCH-type heteroscedasticity of order 3 
White 0.634 No heteroscedasticity 
Total Durbin-Watson 1.884 No serial correlation of order I 
Breusch-Godfrey (2) 0.044 No serial corre lation of order 2 
Breusch-Godfrey (3) 1.353 No serial correlation of order 3 
ARCH (I) 0.451 No ARCH-type heteroscedasticity of order I 
ARCH (2) 0.773 No ARCH-type heteroscedasticity of order 2 
ARCH (3) 1.779 No ARCH-type heteroscedasticity of order 3 
White 2.414 No heteroscedasticity 
35 At a I % level of significance. 
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Table A.ll Diagnostic tests of the R186 government bond yield regressions 
Regression Test Statistic Conclusion 
Before Durbin-Watson 1.710 No serial correlation of order I 
Breusch-Godfi-ey (2) 0.353 No serial correlation of order 2 
Breusch-Godfi-ey (3) 0.450 No serial correlation of order 3 
ARCH (I) 0.253 No ARCH-type heteroscedasticity of order I 
ARCH (2) 0.778 No ARCH-type heteroscedasticity of order 2 
ARCH (3) 3.892 No ARCH-type heteroscedasticity of order 3 
White 0.372 No heteroseedasticity 
On Durbin-Watson 2.18 No serial correlation of order I 
Breuseh-Godfi-ey (2) 2.040 No serial eorrelation of order 2 
Breusch-Godfi-ey (3) 9.526 No serial correlation of order 3 
ARCH (I) 0.094 No ARCH-type heteroscedastieity of order I 
ARCH (2) 0.463 No ARCH-type heteroscedastieity of order 2 
ARCH (3) 1.102 No ARCH-type heteroscedastieity of order 3 
White 5.215 No heteroscedastieity 
After Durbin-Watson 2.46 Results are inconclusive regarding first-order 
serial correiationJ6 
Breusch-Godfi-ey (2) 2.214 No serial correlation of order 2 
Breusch-Godfi-ey (3) 2.351 No serial correlation of order 3 
ARCH (I) 0.025 No ARCH-type heteroseedasticity of order I 
ARCH (2) 0.870 No ARCH-type heteroscedastieity of order 2 
ARCH (3) 1.964 No ARCH-type heteroscedastieity of order 3 
White 0.998 No heteroscedasticity 
Total Durbin-Watson 1.845 No serial correlation of order I 
Breuseh-Godfi-ey (2) 2.558 No serial eorrelation of order 2 
Breusch-Godfi-ey (3) 3.041 No serial eorrelation of order 3 
ARCH (I) 1.591 No ARCH-type heteroscedastieity of order I 
ARCH (2) 4.386 No ARCH-type heteroscedastieity of order 2 
ARCH (3) 6.784 No ARCH-type heteroscedasticity of order 3 
White 0.014 No heteroscedasticity 
36 The Durbin-Watson test statistic fell in the inconclusive range of values. However, the Breuseh-
Godfi-ey test (with a test statistic of 0.851) does not reject the null hypothesis of no first-order serial 
correlation. 
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